Adams, R v (1993) CA

 ^[Theft - later assumption by innocent purchaser not theft – relevance of s 3(2)]
D, a motor cycle enthusiast brought some spare parts for cash. He issued a proper receipt.  He understood they had come from a "write off",  He did not know at the time they had been stolen. A few days later he noticed some of the numbers had been drilled out.

Held: The person who buys property in good faith does not commit theft when he subsequently learns that he is not the owner.

Sec 3(2) “where a person had received property for value in good faith, no later assumption by him of rights which he believed himself to be acquiring would, by reason of a defect in title, amount to theft.”

related to the moment when the receiver purchased for value, not when he decided to keep them.

Not guilty

Comment: Professor Smith; Law of Theft (6th ed.): even if mens rea existed there was no actus reus.

Anderton v Wish [1980] DC

^[Theft - appropriation - changing price tags is appropriation]

D changed the price tags of an item in a supermarket and bought that item at a lower price.

Held: Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounted to appropriation. In changing the price tags the defendant had assumed the rights of an owner and the operation was therefore an appropriation.

Guilty

Atakpu, R v (1993) CA

^[Theft - appropriation - consent]
D hired three expensive cars abroad to sell in England. D argued that no appropriation had taken place in England and therefore the case was not triable in England. 

Held: Goods once stolen could not be stolen again by the same thief, whether the theft took place in England or abroad. Therefore, the cars were stolen abroad where the appropriation took place.

Where a thief came by property by stealing it his later dealings with the property could not be an assumption of rights of an owner

Not guilty

Considered in R v Bowden [2002]

Attorney General of Hong Kong v Nai-Keung [1987] PC

[Theft - property - intangible property]

D, a director of a textile company, sold  a large quantity of the company’s export quotas, at well below their proper value, transferring them to another textile company.

Held: Export quotas, although not ‘things in action’, were a form of "other intangible property" because such quotas may be freely bought and sold. The definition of ‘property’ in the Theft Act 1968 and the corresponding Hong Kong legislation was intended to have the widest ambit.

Furthermore, the defendant had acted outside the scope of his authority to deal with the company’s quotas and had dishonestly appropriated property belonging to the company.

Not guilty but would be now

Considered in Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liquidation), Re [2001]

Attorney General's Reference (Nos.1 and 2 of 1979) CA

^[Theft - intention to permanently deprive - conditional intent sufficient if clear on the indictment]

Two conjoined references where burglars had entered without the intention of stealing a specific item.

Held: Conditional intent suffices.

The court further indicated that in the case of theft-related offences, the indictment need not in appropriate cases specify the items to be stolen, or it may describe the items generically (such as "the contents of a handbag"), provided that the defendant thereby receives adequate details of what he is alleged to have done

Per curiam. Plainly it may be undesirable in some cases to frame indictments by reference to the theft or attempted theft of specific objects. There is no reason in principle against more imprecise pleading, if the justice of the case requires it, as for example, attempting to steal some or all the contents of a car or some or all the contents of a handbag.

Not guilty but would be now

Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 1982) CA

^[Theft - belonging to another - may be a corporation such as a company]

DD allegedly stole large sums of money (millions of pounds) from companies wholly owned and controlled by them. The judge formed the view that the defendants were the company and therefore could not steal from it.

Held: A man in total control of a limited liability company (by reason of his shareholding and directorship) is capable of stealing the property of the company.

A company is a legal entity separate from the defendants, albeit that they were its sole shareholders and directors It can own money, things in action and other property. A company cannot go outside the purpose it was set up (ultra vires its Memorandum of Association)

The ingredient of dishonesty was always a question for the jury, and since, under section 2(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 a defendant's belief that "he would have the other's consent" had to be an honest belief, there was nothing in the subsection which would preclude a jury from convicting.
 

Not guilty, but would be now

Considered in:  R (on the application of A) v Snaresbrook Crown Court [2001]

Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 1983) CA

^[Theft - property  - property does not include a chose in action - transferred by mistake]
D, a policewoman, received an overpayment of her salary, which the MPD paid by direct transfer to her bank account. 

Held: D received property by another’s mistake. By s 5(4) Theft Act 1968 she was not under an obligation to make restoration of the property because the property here was a chose in action, which was not capable of being restored. She was obliged to restore the value of the chose in action, providing the transfer of funds was made under a fundamental mistake.

Not guilty but would be now

Attorney General's Reference (No 1 1985) CA 

^[Theft - belonging to another - received under an obligation - not applicable if remedy is in civil law] 
D sold his own beer in the pub he managed. He was contracted to sell only the brewery beer. 

Held: Remedy was in civil law not criminal. 

Not guilty

Boggeln v Williams (1978) QBD

^[Theft - dishonesty - abstracting electricity]
D failed to pay a bill and was disconnected. D told an employee of the Electricity Board that he intended to reconnect the supply - he did this through the meter so it they would know how much electricity he used. He was charged with abstracting electricity (Sec 13 TA 1968)

Held: D's belief in his own honesty was crucial. Sec 13 did not make taking of electricity without due authority dishonest.

Not Guilty

Bonner, R v (1970) CA

^[Theft - belonging to another - includes a partner or company] 

D broke the lock of the garage of W loaded some scrap metal. The metal was partnership property which he had not taken with the intention permanently to deprive W of it, but only to hold it as a sort of security until W paid him what he alleged was due to him out of the partnership profits

Held: There was nothing in law to prevent a conviction of theft of partnership or company property. 

A partner, who has a proprietary interest in partnership property, may steal it, since his co-partners also have such an interest

In this case the deprived partner's title had not been defeated (if the metal had been melted down and sold to an innocent purchase it might have been)

Not Guilty on the facts

Per curiam: Provided there is the basic ingredient theft one partner can commit theft of partnership property just as much as one person can steal the property of a stranger.

Briggs, R v (2003) CA

^[Theft - appropriation - does not include obtaining by deception]

D deceived elderly relatives into making a payment to her during their house move, whereby she (and her father) obtained title to the new property.

Held: D did not appropriate an item if by fraud she induced the owner to part with that item. R v Naviede [1997] was relied on.

If this were not the case there would be little need for many of the deception offences as many acts of deceptive conduct would be covered by theft, and the word "appropriation" connoted a physical act rather than a more remote action triggering the payment which gave rise to the charge.

Not guilty

Chan Man Sin v Attorney General for Hong Kong (1988) PC

[Theft - appropriation - money from bank accounts which are overdrawn can be theft if within overdraft limits]
D an accountant for H and M withdrew $4.8m from both H’s and M’s accounts using forged cheques. Both accounts went overdrawn, but within agreed limits.

D argued that the bank had no right to honour the forged cheques and the transactions should have been void. 

Held: D was guilty of theft of choses in action, i.e. the debts owed by the bank to the companies.

Lord Oliver:

"One who draws, presents and negotiates a cheque on a particular bank account is assuming the rights of the owner of the credit in the account or (as the case may be) of the pre-negotiated right to draw on the account up to the agreed figure."

Guilty

Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] CD

^[Theft - belonging to another - money paid over by mistake is not owned by the recipient]

C a New York bank paid some $2 million by mistake to a second bank for account of D, a London bank.

Bankruptcy proceedings followed.

Held: That a person who paid money to another under a factual mistake retained ownership of it (in equity).

C had a right to the money it did not belong to the defendant.

C entitled to trace and recover the money

Clowes (No 2), R v [1994] CA

^[Theft - dishonest appropriation - diverting investment money for own use]

DD committed theft and made false statements to induce investors to part with their money. The "Barlow Clowes" group of companies collapsed.

Between 1983 and 1988 millions of pounds were received from investors. Very little of the investors’ money was used to buy investments Instead, all investors’ money was mingled together in deposit accounts from which large sums were withdrawn by C for his own personal use.

Held: The BC group was not authorised to treat investors’ funds as its own, since the nature of the investment scheme stated in the brochures was investment in and the management of British government securities.

The conduct amounted to the appropriation of the property of the investors. It was up to the jury to determine whether he had acted dishonestly and to decide subjectively, i.e. to consider C’s own state of mind as to what he could do with the invested funds and the legal advice he had received which was relevant to that belief.

Guilty

Coffey, R v (1987) CA

^[Theft - intention to permanently deprive]
D obtained bakery machinery from V using a worthless cheque. D had obtained the machinery so that he could exert pressure on V concerning an earlier dispute over which V refused to negotiate or reply. D achieved his purpose. 

Held: Section 6(1) of the Theft Act 1968 can be explained by borrowing the expression "equivalent to an outright taking or disposal" which is found in the second part of section 6.

If the jury thought that D might have intended to return the goods D would be not guilty unless they were sure that he intended that the period of detention should be so long as to amount to an outright taking.

Not guilty

Corcoran v Whent [1977] DC

[Theft - intention to deprive - cannot be formed after food is eaten]

D consumed food and drink at an hotel with a companion intending that the meal should be paid for. When he left the hotel his companion told him that the meal had not been paid for. He was convicted of theft as the justices found that when he was told that the food had not been paid for, the appellant formed the intention permanently to deprive the hotel of it.

Held: It was ridiculous to suggest that any intention relating to food could be formed after it had been consumed.

Not guilty

Dobson v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp (1990) CA

^[Theft - appropriation - consent irrelevant] 
Dobson advertised some jewellery for sale. A rogue bought the jewellery using a stolen building society cheque. Dobson’s home contents insurance company argued that theft was not the cause of his loss, because the appropriation took place with Dobson’s consent. 

Held: In order for there to be a theft there must have been a dishonest appropriation of the items by the purchaser. Following Lawrence the purchaser did assume the rights of the owner. He also did so dishonestly and with intention permanently to deprive Dobson of them. The fact that appropriation took place with Dobson’s consent was irrelevant.

Dobson won, rogue would be guilty

Dunbar, R v [1994] CMAC

^[Theft - what amounts to an obligation]
D offered to buy a car for £1,800 on behalf of X. X gave D £1,800 in cash in return for D's post-dated cheque for that sum as security. D did not buy the car and his cheque was not honoured because in the meantime his account had become overdrawn.

The judge directed the court martial that if it was sure that D and X had agreed that D should buy a specific car for X or else return the money, then as a matter of law, D was under a legal obligation to deal with the money in a particular way within the meaning of the Theft Act 1968 s. 5(3).

Held: The judge's direction had been correct

Not guilty on other 

R. v Hall [1973] and R. v Hayes (1977) disapproved.
 

Duru, R v [1974] CA

^[Theft - intention to permanently deprive includes dishonest obtaining of mortgage money that will be repaid]

D assisted house buyers to obtain mortgages from the Greater London Council where he dealt with such applications. The applications contained false information.

The Council's money was eventually paid as mortgage moneys to the persons who thereupon became mortgagors.

Held: D was guilty of obtaining property, i.e. the cheques, 'with the intention of permanently depriving' the council of them even though the cheques themselves would ultimately go back to the council.

The fact that the mortgagors were under an obligation to repay the mortgage loans did not affect the accused's intention permanently to deprive the council of the cheques.

A cheque as a piece of paper, a cheque form, is personal property and may be stolen, regardless of the balance in the account upon which the cheque is drawn.

Guilty

Easom, R v [1971] CA

^[Theft - Intention permanently to deprive - conditional intention]
D in a cinema picked up a handbag and sorted through the contents. He left the handbag with its contents intact in front of the seat which he had vacated. The handbag had been attached by cotton to a police sergeant's wrist.

Held:  If D merely had it in mind to deprive the owner of such of his property as, proved worth taking but actually took nothing, he would not have stolen it.

D's state of mind is important.

Furthermore there could be no valid conviction of attempted theft unless it were established that he was animated by the same intention to permanently to deprive as would be necessary to establish the full offence.

Lord Scarman:

"In every case of theft the appropriation must be accompanied by the intention of permanently depriving the owner of his property. What may be loosely described as a 'conditional' appropriation will not do. If the appropriator has it in mind merely to deprive the owner of such of his property as, on examination, proves worth taking and then, finding that the booty is valueless to the appropriator, leaves it ready to hand to be repossessed by the owner, the appropriator has not stolen."

Not guilty

Comment: The problems of "conditional intent" were addressed in Attorney General's Reference (Nos.1 and 2 of 1979) CA and sec 1(2) Criminal Attempts Act 1981, if the indictment is properly framed most of the problems of "conditional intent" disappear.

Eddy v Niman (1981) QBD

^[Theft - appropriation - act inconsistent with the rights of the owner]
D placed items in a supermarket trolley intending to steal goods. He changed his mind about stealing them before he reached the checkout. He abandoned the goods in the trolley and left the shop.  

Held: The question to be asked about appropriation was: had the defendant done some overt act inconsistent with the true owner’s rights?

D had merely taken goods from the shelf and placed them in a trolley provided by the store. He had not done any overt act inconsistent with the rights of the owner.

Not guilty

Edwards v Ddin [1976] QBD

^[Theft - property belonging to another]
D drove to a garage and asked the attendant to put in oil and water in his mini, when the attendant went to clean her hands D drove off without paying. Payment was never discussed or offered.

Held: Property passes under a contract of sale when it is intended to pass. The garage and the motorist intended the property in the petrol to pass when it is poured into the tank and irretrievably mixed with the other petrol that is in it.  Thus D could not have appropriated the property of another and was therefore not guilty of theft.

Not guilty

Also here

Feely, R v (1973) CA

^[Theft - dishonesty as a question of fact] 
D a betting shop manager borrowed £30 from the till and later gave an ‘IOU’. D’s employer had issued a memo stating that borrowing from tills was to stop, D knew this.  His employers owed more than twice this sum. 

Held: ‘Dishonesty’ can only relate to D’s own state of mind and it is a question of fact which juries should decide, applying the standards of ordinary decent people.

The word ‘dishonestly’ was an ordinary word of the English language and a jury required no direction by the judge as to its meaning.

Not guilty

Fernandes, R v [1996] CA

^[Theft - appropriation - intention permanently to deprive]

D, a solicitor transferred money from his clients’ account to a higher yielding account in an attempt to cover his personal debts. He was convicted of theft

Held: The critical notion was whether a defendant intended ‘to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights’.

Section 6 could apply to a person in possession or control of another’s property who, dishonestly and for his own purpose, dealt with that property in such a manner that he knew he was risking its loss.

In the present case there was an alleged dishonest disposal of someone else’s money on an obviously insecure investment.

Guilty

Fritschy, R v [1985] CA 

^[Theft - appropriation - consent] 
D dealt in coins (krugerrands) for a Dutch company. D, in accordance with H’s instructions, collected the coins in England took them to Switzerland, but not to H’s Swiss bank. 

Held: Following Morris: There had been no appropriation in England because D had taken possession of the krugerrands with H's authority. Therefore there was no appropriation in England. 
 

Not guilty

Comment: This case is inconsistent with Lawrence and probably wrongly decided.

Gallasso, R v (1993) CA

^[Theft - appropriation - assumption of rights - objective test]

D, a nurse responsible for the care of mentally handicapped patients, quite properly received cheques on behalf of one of them, J, who was incapable of managing his affairs. Although there were already two trust accounts in existence in which J was named as the beneficiary, she opened a third trust account, and paid in a cheque belonging to J.
The prosecution alleged that this was to make it easier for her to make unauthorised withdrawals.
 

Held:  Taking of property with the owner's consent could amount to appropriation, for "appropriation" was an objective description of the act done irrespective of the mental state either of the owner or the accused; but, in the instant case, the paying in of the cheque by G into a trust account of which J was the sole beneficiary could not be regarded as an assumption by G of any of J's rights as owner.

Not guilty

Gardner v Mainsbridge  (1887) QBD

^[Theft - property - mushrooms growing wild]

D gathered mushrooms in a field belonging to A. They were of some value to A, but they grew spontaneously, and were entirely uncultivated. No damage was done by D to the grass or the hedges,

Held: D had not been guilty of an offence under applicable legislation; mushrooms growing wild are not real or personal property.  Things growing in land do not form part of the realty.

Not guilty

Ghosh, R v [1982] CA

^[Theft - dishonesty as a question of fact -objective/subjective, two stage test]
D, a surgeon acting as a locum at a hospital represented that he was owed for operations that he had carried out. Someone else had carried out the operations under the NHS. 

Held: In determining whether D was acting dishonestly, the jury had first to consider whether according to the standards of the ordinary reasonable person what was done was dishonest (the objective test).

If it was, the jury must then consider whether D himself must have realised that what he was doing was dishonest by the standards of the ordinary reasonable person (the subjective test).

Guilty

Comment: This is referred to as the two-fold test.

The main criticism of which is that it does not eradicate the potential for inconsistency between juries, who are required to apply the "current standards of ordinary decent people".

Gilks, R v [1972] CA

^[Theft - belonging to another - money paid by mistake - dishonesty]
D was overpaid winnings by mistake by a bookmaker. D knew that the bookmaker had made a mistake, but he kept the money. D said that "bookmakers are a race apart." It would be dishonest if your grocer gave you too much change and you kept it, but it was not dishonest in the case of a bookmaker.

Held: It was correct to invite the jury to put themselves in the defendant's position and decide whether he thought that he was acting dishonestly or honestly.

Cairns LJ

"On the face of it the defendant's conduct was dishonest: the only possible basis on which the jury could find that the prosecution had not established dishonesty would be if they thought it possible that the defendant did have the belief which he claimed to have."

Guilty

Greenberg, R v (1972)

[Theft - appropriation - ownership]

D took petrol from a self-service petrol station and left without paying.
After taking the petrol he entered the cashier's office with a note in his hand but left without paying while the cashier was attending to other customers.

Held: As D assumed the rights of owner by consent of the garage, and it was not shown that he never intended to pay, no crime was committed.
 

The courts held that at the time of appropriation the driving away the petrol was deemed to have belonged to the defendant.

The charge should not be for theft but for dishonestly obtaining property by deception.

Not guilty 

Greenstein, R v [1976] CA

^[Theft - deception - implied representations - cheques - dishonesty]
DD applied for overlarge volume of shares (called 'stagging') for which he sent a cheque. There was no overdraft facility on the account.  They expected to meet the cost of the shares allotted by using a cheque they would receive for unallotted shares.

Held: The issuing houses would not have issued shares if they knew their own cheques were going to fund the application.

Guilty

Also here

Gomez, DPP v [1993] HL

Whole case here

^[Theft - appropriation - consent irrelevant]
D an assistant at an electrical shop was asked by B to supply goods (£16,000) in exchange for two building society cheques that D knew were stolen. D obtained authority from the manager to supply the goods. D did not tell the manager the cheques were stolen and he had not checked with the bank as he was instructed to do.

Held: There was an appropriation even though he acted with the authority of the shop manager.  Lawrence was the appropriate authority on the issue of appropriation. The consent of the owner was irrelevant in deciding whether an appropriation had taken place.

Lord Keith: 

"...the concept of appropriation in my view involves...an act by way of adverse interference with or usurpation of those rights....The actual decision in Morris was correct, but it was (wrong) to indicate that an act expressly or impliedly authorised by the owner could never amount to an appropriation."

Guilty

Governor Pentonville Prison ex p Osman, R v (1990) QBD

^[Theft - appropriation is the adverse assumption of the rights of an owner] 
D had been bribed in Hong Kong to make loans by drawing money from B's bank in New York by sending a telex.  The alleged activities involved hundreds of millions of US dollars.

(The case was a writ of habeas corpus.  D was in prison awaiting his return to Hong Kong).

Held: A theft takes place where the appropriation and appropriation takes place (normally) where the property is situated.  Sending a telex could amount to an appropriation (even it the account is never debited). Therefore theft had been committed in Hong Kong from where D sent the telex.

An appropriation is the adverse assumption of any of the owner’s rights. This clearly includes the right of an owner of a bank debt. D assumed this right by drawing funds from B’s account.

The English court therefore had jurisdiction.

Application for habeas corpus refused (many times)

Hale, R v (1979) CA

^[Theft - appropriation is a continuing act]

D and E burgled V's house. D was upstairs stealing V's jewellery box E was downstairs tying up V.

Held:

Eveleigh LJ:

'The act of appropriation does not suddenly cease.   It is a continuous act and it is a matter for the jury to decide whether or not the act of appropriation has finished.'

Guilty of robbery

Hall, R v [1972] CA

^[Theft - s 5(3) contractual obligations distinguished]

D, a travel agent, received money from clients for air trips to America. None of the flights materialised and none of the money was refunded.

Held: Although D had a contractual obligation to the clients and could be sued in respect of any breach, he could not be guilty of theft because the clients had not made any special arrangement with D putting him 'under an obligation to retain and deal with... in a particular way' within s 5 (3)  (Where a person receives property from or on account of another, and is under an obligation to the other to retain and deal with that property or its proceeds in a particular way, the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the other).

Not guilty

Disapprovd  in R v Dubar

Hancock, R v [1990] CA

^[Theft - treasure trove - theft of coins - coins must be treasure trove beyond reasonable doubt in order to be stolen - coins do not have to be in actual or constructive possession of the crown]

D was charged with theft from the Crown of 16 ancient coins found in an area which appeared to have been the site of a Romano-Celtic temple.

Held: It was not necessary that property was in the possession, actual or constructive, of the owner (the crown) when it was stolen.

A jury can determine whether the coins were in fact treasure trove and thus the property of the Crown, but they must apply the criminal burden and standard of proof.

A coroner’s inquest to establish that the property is treasure trove is no longer a prerequisite for a charge of theft of treasure trove.

Not guilty on a jury misdirection

Hibbert v McKiernan (1948) KBD

^[Theft - belonging to another - possession or control]
D was a trespasser on a golf course, he collected 8 lost golf balls for his own use. He had previously been warned off and the club had taken steps to exclude such persons (including employing the police to do so).

Held: He was he was guilty of stealing from the club who owned the land and possessed the balls.  By excluding trespassers they possessed the golf balls even though they did not know how many.

D was not guilty of stealing from the original owners who had abandoned them.

Guilty

Hinks, R v (2000) HL

Whole case here

^[Theft - appropriation – includes ‘gifts’ – where actions are dishonest]

D a carer of a 53-year-old man of low intelligence persuaded him to make gifts to her totalling £60,000 (almost all his savings).

Held:

Lord Steyn:

It was held in R v Lawrence (1972) and DPP v Gomez (1993) that it was immaterial whether the act of appropriation was done with or without the owner's consent or authority.

"Appropriation" is a neutral word comprehending "any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner".

A person could appropriate property belonging to another where the other person made him an indefeasible gift of property, retaining no proprietary interest or any right to resume or recover any proprietary interest in the property.

D had acted dishonestly.

Guilty

Huskinson, DPP v [1988] DC

^[Theft no obligation to pay Housing benefit]
D, the tenant of a bed-sitting room. He fell into arrears of rent and applied for housing benefit. He only gave about half to his landlord.

Held: There is no obligation to pay housing benefit to the landlord (and no such obligation can be implied), and accordingly failure to do so is not an offence within the Theft Act 1968.
 

Whilst the tenant has an obligation to pay his rent to his landlord, he is not obliged to give his housing benefit directly in satisfaction of any arrears

Not guilty

Holden, R v [1991] CA

^[Theft - not dishonest if honestly believed he had or would have had owner's consent - relevance of dishonesty]

D took tyres from his former employer in the belief that he had permission to remove the tyres, or believed it would have been granted had he sought it.

Held:  The reasonableness of a defendant's belief was irrelevant to the question of dishonesty.

The question was whether H had, or might have had, the necessary honest belief, reasonably or not.

Not guilty

Hussein, R v [1978] CA

^[Theft - intention to steal anything of value - conditional intent is not theft]
D, in the middle of the night appeared to open the back door of a van.  On the approach of a PC they made off
Appeal against conviction.
The van had eccentric features. The interior of the van was covered with white rabbit fur which extended over the dashboard and inside the door.

In the van was a holdall which contained valuable sub-aqua equipment.

Held: What has to be established is an intention to steal at the time as expressed in Easom (1971)

"In every case of theft the appropriation must be accompanied by the intention of permanently depriving the owner of his property. What may be loosely described as a 'conditional' appropriation will not do. If the appropriator has it in mind merely to deprive the owner of such of his property as, on examination, proves worth taking and then, finding that the booty is valueless to the appropriator, leaves it ready to hand to be repossessed by the owner, the appropriator has not stolen."

Comment: The problems of "conditional intent" were addressed in Attorney General's Reference (Nos.1 and 2 of 1979) CA and sec 1(2) Criminal Attempts Act 1981, if the indictment is properly framed most of the problems of "conditional intent" disappear.

J, DPP v
[2002] QBD

Citation:

BLD 210202637

^[Theft - intention to permanently deprive includes damaging property]

DD who were 14 robbed another boy.  They snatched his headphones and broke them in half, and then returned them to the boy.

Held:  An intention to permanently deprive could be inferred from the acts of the defendants. Once they had snapped the headphones, they had rendered them useless. Moreover by snatching and snapping the article, they had in reality disposed of it.

An action whose result rendered property useless, was in effect no different from an action which risked the loss of that article.

Guilty

Kaur (Dip) v Chief Constable Hants (1981) DC