|
Backshall, R v
(1998) CA
R v Backshall (1989) CA |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - available for careless driving and dangerous driving]
D drove his vehicle
from side to side and had applied his brakes several times. Another
driver overtook him and then attacked the windows of D’s car with a
hammer. D drove away at erratically at speed.
Held:
The defence of
necessity or duress of circumstances is available for dangerous and
careless driving. It was desirable that necessity was available as a
defence so that it would be plain to the jury or fact-finding tribunal
that it was not sufficient to take an objective view of the driving itself
without taking account of the reasons for it.
Not guilty |
|
Bell, DPP v
[1992] QBD
DPP V Bell [1992] QBD |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - available only while threat persists]
D was involved in an
argument and, fearing serious personal injury, ran to his car (pursued by
several others) and drove away. He was over the blood-alcohol limit.
Held:
It was significant
that D had driven "only a short way" (the actual distance not being
reported), since his defence would have ceased to exist had he continued
to drive after the duress of circumstances had evaporated.
Not guilty
|
|
Blythe, R v (1998)
Warrington CC
News report here

R v Blythe (1998) |
^[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity]
D cultivated
cannabis with intent to supply it to his wife who was dying with multiple
sclerosis. D feared W might commit suicide and pleaded duress of
circumstances.
Held:
The trial judge told
the jury that the defence was not available in such a case. Nevertheless,
the jury disregarded this instruction and found D not guilty.
Guilty of possession fined £100
Also here |
|
Bourne, R
v (1939) Central Criminal Court Macnaghten J

R v Bourne (1939) |
^[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - to protect mother's life]
D
a surgeon, of the highest skill, openly, in
one of the London hospitals, without fee performed an otherwise illegal
abortion to save the girl from becoming a "physical and mental
wreck". She was not quite 15 and the victim of a rape.
Held:
The jury found that the operation was performed in
good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the girl.
The surgeon had not got to wait until the patient was in peril of
immediate death, if he was of opinion that the pregnancy would make the
patient a physical and mental wreck.
[Although the judge in this case did not use the word 'necessity, Lord
Denning in
London Borough of Southwark
v. Williams stated it was]
Not guilty |
|
Brown, R v
[2007] DC |
^[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - cannot succeed when threat has passed]
D drove over the legal alcohol limit.
After a party, D received a telephone call saying that three lads were on
their way to the house and were "going to get you, Brownie."
D was terrified and he decided to drive to
his grandmother's home
As he left he did not think that 3 men
nearby had seen him. They did not chase him.
D was stopped by the police for speeding after about three miles.
He agreed that he was not under threat when
he was stopped.
Held: It is quite plain that the
defence of duress of circumstances ceased to be available to D long before
he was stopped by the police. He was not being pursued and he had no
grounds to think that he was being pursued.
Guilty |
|
Cichon, R v
[1994] QBD
R v Cichon [1994] QBD |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - cannot succeed where Parliament clearly did not allow a
defence]
D had a fighting dog
unmuzzled in public. The dog was sick and/or choking, and that he removed
the muzzle to allow it to breathe.
Held: Balcombe LJ;
The Dangerous Dogs
Act 1991 was a draconian measure, and it was clear that Parliament had not
envisaged any exceptions to its requirements. The dog's illness posed no
threat of death or serious injury to any person while it was muzzled, and
neither statute nor common law allowed a dog owner to make a value
judgement as between the well-being of his dog and the safety of the
public.
Guilty
Comment:
More on dangerous dogs,
here |
|
Conway, R v (1989)
CA

R v Conway (1989) CA |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - reckless driving - imminent threat]
D drove
recklessly to avoid police whom he thought were going to shoot passenger.
(Did not know they were police)
D was in his car
with a passenger who had been attacked some weeks previously. Two men
approached so he drove off. The two men pursued in another car and so he
continued to try to escape driving recklessly. The two men were
plain-clothes policemen; D claimed he was trying to protect his
passenger.
Held:
The jury should have
been allowed to consider "duress of circumstances" as a defence.
Not guilty |
|
CPS v
Brown [2007] QBD |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
- not available when danger passed]
D drove over the drink drive limit whilst escaping from three men who
phoned to say they were on their way to his house and were 'going to get
him'. D drove to his grandmother's house about seven miles away. He
claimed the defence of duress of circumstances.
Held: Although the defence had been available to the defendant when
he first drove away, once he had realised that he was not being followed
by the three males, he should not have continued driving. The case would
be remitted with a direction to convict.
Guilty |
|
Dudley & Stephens, R v (1884) CCR
 |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - neither necessity nor duress of circumstances is available as
a defence in cases of murder]
Three sailors and a
cabin boy were shipwrecked and were adrift in an open boat 1600 miles from
land. After they had been eight days without food, and six without water,
DD decided that their only chance of survival was to kill the cabin boy
and eat him, and this they did. Four days later they were picked up by a
passing ship, and on returning to England were convicted of murder.
Held:
Necessity can never
be a defence to murder. Their sentence of death was later commuted to six
months' imprisonment.
Guilty
Also
here |
|
F v West Berkshire
Health Authority (1989) HL
 |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - medical cases]
Doctors sought
permission to sterilise a 36-year-old woman with a mental age of five, who
had become sexually active but who because of her condition she was
incapable of giving informed consent.
Doctors agreed that
the psychological effects of pregnancy would be seriously damaging to her,
and sought a declaration that they would be acting lawfully in sterilising
the woman without obtaining her consent, which she was mentally incapable
of giving.
Held: Lord Brandon;
Where an adult
patient is unable to give or refuse consent - for example, because he is
unconscious or mentally disabled, the doctor has a right - perhaps even a
duty - to give treatment that is in the patient's best interests, to save
his life or to prevent deterioration or ensure improvement in his physical
or mental health. Lord Goff;
(obiter) “….a man
who seizes another and forcibly drags him from the path of an oncoming
vehicle, thereby saving him from injury or even death, commits no wrong.”
Declaration of lawful sterilisation approved |
|
Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] HL
 |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - doctor prescribing contraceptives]
Mrs Gillick a Roman Catholic mother of five daughters sought a
declaration that a doctor would be acting unlawfully if he gave
contraceptive treatment for any of her daughters without the mother's
consent.
It was argued on the one hand that teenage pregnancies
would increase if the courts ruled that parental consent was necessary, on
the other hand that the judges would be encouraging under-age sex if they
did not.
Held:
A doctor could
prescribe contraceptives to a girl under 16 to prevent damage to her
health, even though he knew it would assist a man to have unlawful sexual
intercourse.
By a majority of three to two. A child under 16 who can
fully understand the implications of the proposed treatment (a "Gillick
competent" child) can give her own consent to medical treatment.
(Since Parliament had not legislated, the courts had to make a decision
one way or the other.)
Mrs Gillick lost
Also
here |
|
Johnson v
Phillips [1975] QBD |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity]
D ordered by PC to
reverse the wrong way up a one-way street to allow ambulances access to an
injured person. D refused and was charged with wilfully obstructing a
constable in the execution of his duty.
Held:
"a constable may
direct other persons to disobey traffic regulations if that is reasonably
necessary for the protection of life and property"
Whether this may or may not amount to superior
orders, or to the defence of necessity was not made clear
|
|
Kitson, R v (1955) CA

R v Kitson (1955) CA
|
^[General Defences - duress of
circumstances - driving - early example of defence not raised - cited
in Re: A Children]
D was seen by the Leeds police in a motor car. The car followed an
erratic course for about 300 yards down a hill and was then steered by
D on to a grass verge.
D’s case was that the car had been
driven by his brother-in-law. D said that he himself had fallen
asleep. He woke up and found that the car was moving on its own its
own. He immediately grabbed the steering wheel and tried to control
the car. He did not put on the handbrake because of the greasy
condition of the road.
D was so drunk that he was incapable of
having proper control of the car. He was convicted of driving the car
when under the influence of drink.
Held: On the facts of the case
appellant was ‘driving’ the car within the meaning of that section,
and the conviction must be affirmed.
Guilty
Comment: Nobody suggested
that he was entitled to rely on a defence of necessity or duress of
circumstances. |
|
Leigh v
Gladstone (1909) TLR |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - to save life]
It was not assault
to force-feed a prisoner (a sufraget) against her will if it was to save her from
injury. |
|
Martin, R v (1989)
CA

R v Martin (1989) CA |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity]
Disqualified driver
drove stepson to work (had overslept) fearing he would lose his job that
would cause wife to commit suicide.
Held:
"duress of
circumstances" should have been considered as a defence.
Not guilty |
|
Melchett, R v (2000)
Norwich Crown Court
R v Melchett (2000)
News report here |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - pressure groups destroy or damage]
D, The Lord Melchett
and 27 Greenpeace members destroyed GM crops arguing they had acted to
protect the environment.
Not guilty by a jury |
|
Mouse's Case
(1608) KB
 |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - damage to property acceptable to save life]
A barge en route
from Gravesend to London was in danger of sinking when a storm started.
Some of the fifty passengers threw various items overboard to lighten the
ship. Mouse was the owner of some of this cargo, and brought a civil
action for trespass to goods.
Held:
Their
actions had been justified by the danger to life.
|
|
Perka v The
Queen (1984) Supreme Court of Canada |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity]
The Supreme Court of
Canada acknowledged the existence of the defence of duress of
circumstances in general terms.
Dickson J
"If the
defence of necessity is to form a valid and consistent part of our
criminal law it must, as has been universally recognised, be strictly and
scrupulously limited to situations which correspond to its underlying
rationale".
|
|
Pommell, R v
[1995] CA
R v Pommell [1955] CA |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity]
D found in bed with
a loaded machine gun. D claimed that he had taken it off another man to
prevent him using it, and was going to take it to the police in the
morning.
Held:
He should have been
allowed to raise the defence of duress of circumstances, but that the jury
would need to consider his behaviour with the gun to decide if the duress
had ceased.
A re-trial was ordered |
|
Quayle
and others and AG Ref (No 2 of 2004) [2005] CA
Whole case
here
 |
[Defences – medical necessity (duress of
circumstances) – not available for medicinal use of cannabis – judicial
law-making – principle not policy]
DD (six conjoined cases) smoked cannabis to relieve pain, another D
imported cannabis for the benefit of others who used it for medicinal
purposes or to ease the passage to death. There was no medical dispute as
to its painkilling properties in some cases.
Held: There is no common law defence of “medical
necessity”, nor do the various statutes provide for a defence. Doctors are
not permitted to prescribe cannabis except for certain trials, it would
not be appropriate therefore for individuals to make cannabis available
for themselves or others.
For the purpose of the defence of necessity (duress of circumstances),
there is a requirement of threat of serious injury, which would not
include suicide by the defendant.
Lord Justice Mance delivering the judgment of the court stated that the
judgment was based on established principles and not policy; he quoted
from McLoughlin v O'Brien [1983] “…If
principle leads to results which are thought to be socially unacceptable,
Parliament can legislate to draw a line or map out a new path.”
Guilty
Comment: This case was apparently referred to the Court
of Appeal by the highest level within the CPS.
Cannabis trials are only available for multiple sclerosis (MS) sufferers,
which did not apply to any of the defendants.
It is possible that juries will still acquit in some cases even though no
such defence exists; if raised the ‘defence’ should not be allowed to go
to the jury.
This case has not gone to the House of Lords.
The common law defence of necessity by
extraneous circumstances is not available where its role would be to
legitimise conduct which is contrary to the clear legislative policy
and scheme adopted in relation to controlled drugs. |
|
Re A
(Children) (2000) CA
 |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - distinction between innocent
life and one that threatens life of another]
Doctors sought the leave of the court to separate
conjoined twins, as the separation was necessary to save the life of one
of them. If they remained conjoined both would die. Jodie had a good
chance of a fairly "normal" life. Mary was using Jodie’s heart and lungs;
Mary had no prospect of an independent life. If they were separated Mary
would immediately die.
Brooke LJ, quoting Sir James Stephen more than a hundred
years earlier;
There are three conditions for necessity to operate as a
defence:
-
the act is needed to avoid inevitable
and irreparable evil,
-
no more should be done than is
reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved, and,
-
the evil inflicted must not be
disproportionate to the evil avoided.
These conditions were satisfied in the instant
case.
The decision in R v
Dudley & Stephens (endorsed by the House of Lords in R v Howe
was
distinguishable: that case involved the taking of an innocent life, while
in the instant case the life to be taken was that of a person who
(although morally blameless) was slowly killing her sister and who was
already "designated for death".
Declaration approved,
operation carried out Mary died Jodie is living a normal life at the time
of writing.
Also
here |
|
Rodger &
Rose, R v [1998] CA |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances - necessity – circumstances must
be 'external']
D’s claimed that they had been forced to escape from
prison because otherwise they would have been driven to commit suicide as
a result of the extreme depression they were suffering.
Held: For the defence to apply, the "circumstances" had to be
external to the actual offender.
Guilty |
|
Southwark BC v Williams [1971] CA
 |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - policy issues]
A homeless family
squatted in an empty Council house, and resisted the Council's efforts to
evict them.
Held:
Lord Denning MR;
If hunger were
allowed as an excuse for stealing, or homelessness as a defence to
trespass, it would open a door through which all kinds of lawlessness and
disorder would pass; each would say his need was greater than the next
man's.
Council’s action succeeded |
|
Stephens,
R v (2002) Carmathen Magistrates (The
Times 10 Oct 2002)
R v Stephens (2002) |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - possessing cannabis - on the grounds that it was used for medical
purposes]
D aged 45 possessed
55gm of cannabis which helped him reduce his dependence on morphine to
ease the pain of cervical spondylosis a severe spinal disease
Held:
Brad Stephens
acquitted on the evidence
The cannabis was
however, ordered to be destroyed.
Not guilty
Comment:
It is thought to be
the first time that a legal defence of necessity has been used
successfully in such circumstances. |
|
Willer, R v (1986)
CA

R v Willer (1986) CA |
[General Defences - duress of circumstances
-necessity - escape from gang]
D drove ‘recklessly’
at about 10 mph through a pedestrian precinct to escape from a gang
threatening violence to him and his passengers.
Held:
Duress should in any
case have been left to the jury. This was not the usual sort of duress -
the gang had not told D to drive on the pavement - but duress of
circumstances could be used even where necessity could not.
[Necessity – if it ever had existed - has been
largely replaced by the new defence of "duress of circumstances". This
case was the first recognition as such]
Not guilty
Also here |