AG's Ref (No. 4 of 1980)
[1981] CA
Church, R v (1965) CA
Fagan v
Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] QBD
Jakeman, R v (1982) CA
Kaitamaki v The
Queen [1984] PC (New Zealand)
Le Brun, R v [1991] CA
Masilela, S v (1968)
Miller, R v [1983] HL
Taaffe, R v (1984) HL
Thabo Meli v R [1954]
PC (South Africa)
|
AG's Ref (No. 4 of 1980) [1981] CA |
[Coincidence of
actus reus and mens rea]
D, in the course of a struggle pushed his girlfriend head first over
the landing rail so that she landed on her head on the floor below.
Believing her to be dead he then dragged her upstairs by a rope around her
neck. Finally he cut her throat with a knife before cutting up the
body in a bath and then disposing of it.
Held: It was impossible to establish whether V died in the original
fall or whether he killed her by his subsequent actions.
A
manslaughter conviction was possible, despite uncertainty as to the actual
cause of death, but only if it could be proved that each of D's acts was
performed with the requisite mens rea for that offence.
Since the initial fall may well have killed V, it would not suffice to
establish mens rea (such as gross negligence) only in the
subsequent act of disposal: the prosecution also had to disprove D's claim
that he had merely pushed her away in a 'reflex action' when she dug her
nails into him in the struggle on the upstairs landing.
Guilty gross negligence manslaughter. |
|
Church, R v (1965) CA
 |
[Coincidence of
actus reus and mens rea- actus reus can be
continuing]
D took V (a married woman) to a van for sexual purposes. V mocked D and
slapped him D knocked V unconscious. Unable to revive her he panicked and
threw her into a river. V drowned.
Held: D's conduct amounted to a series of acts, which culminated in
her death and thus constituted manslaughter.
Edmund Davies:
'an unlawful act causing the death of another cannot, simply because it is
an unlawful act, render a manslaughter verdict inevitable. For such a
verdict inexorably to follow, the unlawful act must be such as all sober and
reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person
to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious
harm.'
”A grosser case of criminal negligence it would be difficult to imagine.”
Guilty of manslaughter. |
|
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] QBD
 |
^[Assault - definition - apprehension of immediate force - contemporaneity
of actus and mens - battery - inflicting unlawful personal violence -
intentionally or recklessly – indirect force - coincidence of actus reus and
mens rea - actus reus 'continuing act principle']
D assaulted PC Morris by parking his car on his foot. Initially he drove onto
the officer’s foot accidentally. When first asked to remove the car he refused
but eventually complied.
Held: Failure to act could not
constitute an assault, but the actus reus was a continuing act and coincided
at some point with the requisite mens rea.
An assault is any act which
intentionally or possibly recklessly causes another person to apprehend
immediate and unlawful personal violence.
James:
"A mere omission
to act cannot amount to an assault."
"For an assault to be committed both the elements of actus reds and mens rea
must be present at the same time.'
'It is not necessary that mens rea should be present at the inception of the
actus reus; it can be superimposed upon an existing act."
"On the other hand, the subsequent inception of mens rea cannot convert an
act which has been complete without mens rea into an assault."
Where
an assault involved a battery, it matters not whether the battery is inflicted
directly by the body of the offender or through the medium of some weapon or
instrument controlled by the action of the offender. To constitute this
offence, some intentional act must have been performed; a mere omission to act
cannot amount to an assault.
If the act, as distinct from the results thereof, is a continuing act, there
is a continuing threat to inflict unlawful force. If the assault involves a
battery and that battery continues, there is a continuing act of assault.
Guilty
Comment: For an omission amounting to an
assault see
Santana-Bermudez, DP P v (2003) DC
|
|
Jakeman, R v (1982) CA |
[Coincidence of
actus reus and mens rea - actus reus committed by
innocent agent]
D was
importing two suitcases of cannabis from Ghana. She left the suitcases at
Paris and the French authorities assumed it had been misrouted and
forwarded it to England. She claimed to have repented during the flight
backing this up by not claiming the suitcase; this did not amount to a
defence.
Held: The mens rea existed at the start of the journey,
the actus reus was completed, albeit by an innocent agent. The
offence therefore contained the required elements.
Guilty |
|
Kaitamaki v The
Queen [1984] PC (New Zealand) |
^[Coincidence
of
actus reus and mens rea - actus reus 'continuing act
principle']
D broke into a young woman's flat and twice raped her. D claimed that the
woman consented or he honestly believed that she was consenting. On the
second occasion after he had penetrated her he became aware that she was
not consenting but he did not desist from intercourse.
Held: Sexual intercourse starts on penetration and "continues" until
it stops. If the act continues when consent is withdrawn the offence is
complete. Since rape is defined as "having" intercourse without consent a
man was guilty of rape within the section if he continued intercourse
after he realised that the woman was no longer consenting.
Guilty |
|
Le Brun, R v [1991] CA
 |
[Coincidence of
actus reus and mens rea - actus reus 'continuing act
principle']
D knocked his wife unconscious. He dragged her away to avoid detection,
whist dragging her she hit her head on the kerb fracturing her skull, and
she died.
Held: The original unlawful act with its accompanying mens rea was not
the direct cause of death, but the unlawful act and the act causing death
were part of "the same sequence of events", and that was sufficient.
Guilty manslaughter |
|
Masilela, S v (1968) |
[Coincidence of
actus reus and mens rea - actus reus 'continuing act
principle']
"D intending to kill P, knocked him unconscious and,
believing him to be dead, set fire to the house. P died from the fumes.
If he had not been unconscious he would have been able to walk out, so
knocking him unconscious was a cause of death. But it is probable
that the chain of causation would be regarded as broken if the house had
been set on fire by a tramp who happened to come along after D's
departure."
From Smith & Hogan 10th ed p94.
|
|
Miller, R v [1983] HL
 |
^[Coincidence
of
actus reus and mens rea - actus reus 'continuing act
principle']
D a vagrant was sleeping in a building, and fell asleep on his mattress.
When he woke up, he saw that his cigarette had caused the mattress to
smoulder. Instead of calling for help, just moved into another room. The
fire flared up and spread.
Held: He was convicted of
arson, not for starting the fire but for failing to do anything about it.
Lord Diplock:
"...I see no rational ground for excluding from conduct
capable of giving rise to criminal liability, conduct which consists of
failing to take measures that lie within one's power to counteract a
danger that one has oneself created, if at the time of such conduct one's
state of mind is such as constitutes a necessary ingredient of the
offence. I venture to think that the habit of lawyers to talk of "actus
reus,"
suggestive as it is of action rather than inaction, is responsible for any
erroneous notion that failure to act cannot give rise to criminal
liability in English law."
Guilty of arson
(criminal damage by fire) |
|
Taaffe, R v (1984) HL |
^[Coincidence of
actus reus and mens rea - must have correct mens rea
appropriate to the act]
D wrongly believing that
importing currency was illegal sought to smuggle several packages from
Holland. He had been enlisted by a third party to import cannabis. There
was no such offence of importing currency and he could not be liable for
attempting a crime that does not exist.
Held: For this offence D must be judged on the facts as he believed
them to be. His mens rea for an non existent crime could not be
imported to the smuggling of drugs.
D's mistake of law could not convert the importation of currency into a
criminal offence: and importing currency is what D had assumed he was
doing.
Not guilty
This has become know as the "Taaffe defence" much favoured by
smugglers |
|
Thabo Meli v R [1954] PC
(South Africa)
 |
[Contemporaneity of mens rea and actus reus applies to actions as a
whole - coincidence of actus reus and mens rea - actus reus 'continuing
act principle']
D and accomplices took V to a hut and beat him over the head intending to
kill him. They rolled his body over a cliff to make the death appear
accidental. In fact, the victim survived both the beating and the fall
from the cliff, but died from exposure shortly afterwards.
Held:
Actus and mens were present throughout; no need to separate
them, there was a causal link.
Where the actus reus consists of a series of linked
acts, it is enough that the mens rea existed at some time during that
series, even if not necessarily at the time of the particular act which
caused the death.
Lord Reid:
"[It is] ... impossible to divide up what
was really one series of acts in this way. There is no doubt that the
accused set out to do all these acts in order to achieve their plan, and
as parts of their plan; and it is much too refined a ground of judgment
to say that, because they were under a misapprehension at one stage and
thought that their guilty purpose had been achieved before, in fact, it
was achieved, therefore they are to escape the penalties of the law."
Guilty of murder |
|