|
AB v Leeds
Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2004] QBD |
^[Negligence - duty of care medical
practitioner removing and retaining organs from child’s body owed a duty
of care to the parents]
D the hospitals that had retained tissue from the bodies of deceased
children taken at or after post-mortem without the knowledge or consent of
the parents The claimants were three lead claimants in group litigation.
In each case, they consented to the carrying out of a post mortem, but
were not informed in detail of the procedure or that organs might be
removed and retained. Where organs had been retained, they were often
treated in some way so as to preserve them.
Held: In the case of a doctor treating a mother who had had a child
which had died, the doctor would have a duty to advise the mother about
future pregnancies. That duty extended to giving the parents an
explanation of the purpose of the post mortem and what it involved,
including alerting them to the fact that organs might be retained.
|
|
Alcock v Chief Constable of
South Yorkshire
[1991] HL
|
[Tort - negligence - duty of care- floodgates and
policy - rescuers]
A further action following the
Hillsborough tragedy brought by those that helped at the scene.
Held: Rescuers should continue to
qualify on policy grounds even though they were not in a close
relationship with the victim. Friends and relatives raised the spectre of
the "floodgates" argument, and the fear of opening up unlimited liability.
Lord Oliver openly used the word "policy" in
explaining his decision.
Also
here |
|
Alexandrou v Oxford (1993) CA |
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – no duty situations - public policy – no duty owed in operational
matters]
D, the
police failed to respond effectively when C’s alarm went off and a burglar
escaped.
Held: There was no sufficient "special relationship" between the
shop owner and the police to create a duty of care. If there were a duty
in this case, there would be a similar duty towards anyone reporting a
crime against his person or property.
C lost |
|
Anns v
London Borough of Merton (1977) HL |
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – proving fault - development – 2 stage test – just and
reasonable]
D, the
LA had allowed builders to construct a block of flats with foundations
which were only 2 feet 6 inches deep instead of 3 feet or deeper and had
failed to carry out the necessary inspections C leased seven flats. Cracks
in the walls and sloping of floors occurred.
Held: A two stage test was developed, this has now been replaced by
the three stages in
Caparo v Dickman
This case overruled
Murphy v Brentwood District Council
|
|
Barber v Somerset
County Council [2004] HL
Whole case
here |
[Tort – negligence – duty of care –
overworked schoolteacher – duty owed when problem known or should have
been known]
D the council which employed C a 52 year old schoolteacher as head of
mathematics in a comprehensive school. He worked long hours about which he
complained of ‘work overload’. Following a period of sickness because he
was ‘overstressed/depression’ he suffered a mental breakdown at school.
Held: The school owed C a duty of care, and their breach
of that caused the claimant’s nervous breakdown. The employer’s duty to
take some action arose when the claimant saw separately each member of the
school’s senior management team. It continued so long as nothing was done
to help the claimant. The senior management team should have made
inquiries about his problems and seen what they could have done to ease
them, instead of brushing him off unsympathetically or sympathising but
simply telling him to prioritise his work.
Stokes v Guest, Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd [1968]
applied.
C won |
|
Barnett v Chelsea Hospital Management Committee (1969) QBD
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – causation in fact – negligence essential - omission can give
rise to liability]
D, hospital where C went because of stomach pains and vomiting. The doctor
refused to examine him and sent him home untreated; he died of arsenic
poisoning five hours later. His family sued the hospital.
Held: C would probably have died even if the proper treatment had been
given promptly, so the hospital's negligence was not the cause of his
death.
C’s family lost |
|
Barrett v Ministry of
Defence [1995] CA |
^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - C's own actions - assuming a duty
of care]
A
naval airman became so drunk at the Royal Navy Air Station where he was
serving that he died. The duty Petty Officer, had the rating placed on his
bunk he vomited and died as a result of inhaling his own vomit.
It was alleged that D failed to enforce disciplinary regulations to
prevent drunkenness.
Held: The deceased alone was responsible for his own actions and
that no duty was owed to him in this respect.
However, the Ministry was held liable on the basis that, following his
collapse, service personnel voluntarily assumed a duty of care and were
negligent in that capacity.
Foresight of harm alone was not sufficient to create a duty to guard him
against his own folly.
Beldam LJ stated:
"To dilute self-responsibility and to
blame one adult for another’s lack of self-control is neither just nor
reasonable and in the development of the law of negligence an increment
too far.”
“Until he collapsed, I would hold that the deceased was in law alone
responsible for his condition. Thereafter, when the defendant assumed
responsibility for him, it accepts that the measures taken fell short of
the standard reasonably to be expected. It did not summon medical
assistance and its supervision of him was inadequate”.
Airman's widow won |
|
Barrett
(AP) v Enfield London Borough Council (1999) HL
Whole case, here |
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care imposed on Local Authority for children in care]
C was left psychologically damaged and an alcoholic when he left care of D
a Local Authority.
Held: Taking a child into care pursuant to a statutory power did
not create a duty of care.
However, C’s allegations
were largely directed to the way in which the powers of the local
authority were exercised, a duty of care was owed and was broken.
Whether it was just and
reasonable to impose a liability for negligence had to be decided on the
basis of what was proved. Which except in the clearest cases, required an
investigation of the facts.
C won |
|
Beasley
v Buckinghamshire CC (1997) QBD
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – no duty situations - distinction between policy and practical
considerations]
C a foster parent was injured while looking after a foster child, a
handicapped teenager. Foster parent alleged council had not provided
adequate training and equipment.
Held: C’s complaint concerned not the policy decision whether to
use her services, but the “practical manner” in which the council had
acted. They had not supplied proper training and equipment
|
|
Bici v Ministry of Defence
[2004] CA |
^[Tort - negligence - duty of care -
psychiatric harm - service personnel]
Soldiers taking part in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Kosovo
deliberately fired on a vehicle full of people when they had no
justification in law for doing so, killing two and injuring others.
Held: The soldiers were liable in negligence to two of the
claimants. They owed a duty to prevent personal injury to the public and
had breached that duty by firing without justification. There was
no objective evidence that they were about to be fired on by the
claimants. They were in breach of duty, not due to the manner in which
they fired their weapons, but in firing at all. Furthermore, the claimants
were not contributorily negligent
Self-defence is available in negligence if it is reasonable belief (in
criminal law it is an honest belief) the defendant’s conduct was not
reasonable.
Combat immunity which was raised in
Mulcahy,
has no place in this claim. Combat
immunity is not a defence but removes the action from the jurisdiction of
the court is:
"It is relied
upon when a person is injured or their property is damaged or destroyed
in circumstances where they are the “innocent” victims of action which
is taken out of pressing necessity in the wider public interest arising
out of combat."
C won
in part
(Obiter)
Had the soldiers been acting in lawful self defence, their firing,
inaccurate as it was, would not have been considered negligent in the
circumstances
[comment]
This was the first claim for compensation involving British peacekeeping
forces abroad. |
|
Blyth v
Birmingham Waterworks (1856) Exch
|
[Tort – negligence - what
it is]
Baron Alderson:
“Negligence
is the omission to do something, which a reasonable man, guided upon
those considerations, which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or doing something, which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do. The standard demanded is thus not of perfection but of
reasonableness. It is an objective standard taking no account of the
defendant's incompetence - he may do the best he can and still be found
negligent”
|
|
Bolam v Friern Barnet Hospital Management Committee (1957)
QBD
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – standard of care and skill expected of D]
D
hospital gave electro-convulsive therapy that broke D’s bones. Some
doctors would give relaxant drugs others would not.
Held: A doctor is not guilty of negligence is he has acted in
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of
medical men skilled in that particular art.
|
|
Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1997] HL
Whole case, here |
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – assessing the standard of care and skill of D]
C aged
2 suffered serious brain damage following respiratory failure. Several
expert witnesses supported the doctor, and on that basis, the judge found
that the doctor had not been negligent.
Held: A doctor may be negligent even if there is a body of medical
opinion in his favour: he must also be able to show that this opinion has
a logical basis. Only very rarely would a judge decide that the opinions
of a number of otherwise competent doctors were not reasonably held, and
this was not such a case.
C lost |
|
Bolton v Stone [1951] HL
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – factors to consider – practicality and cost of precautions]
D was a
cricket club from where a cricket ball was struck over a 17-feet fence.
It hit C who was standing on the pavement outside her house. The ball must
have travelled about 100 yards, and such a thing had happened only about
six times in thirty years.
Held: The risk was so slight and the expense of reducing it so
great that a reasonable cricket club would not have taken any further
precautions.
C lost |
|
Bourhill v Young
(1943) HL
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care - proximity - foreseeable]
D
motorcyclist fatally injured. C pregnant fishwife 15 yards away saw
blood but did not see actual accident. Caused shock and,
subsequently, a miscarriage.
Held: C was not owed a duty of care it was not reasonably
foreseeable that accident would cause her to suffer such injuries.
C lost |
|
Bradford
Corporation v Pickles [1895] HL |
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care - proving fault - malice not normally relevant]
D owned land containing underground streams which fed C's (Bradford
Corporation) waterworks. D began to sink shafts for the alleged
purpose of draining certain beds of stone. The effect of D’s
operations was to affect seriously the supply of water to appellant’s
springs. The corporation alleged that defendant was not acting in good
faith, but to compel them to purchase his land.
Held:
D has the right to divert or appropriate the water within his own land so
as to deprive his neighbour of it. His right is the same whatever his
motive may be, whether genuinely to improve his own land, or maliciously
to injure his neighbour, or to induce his neighbour to buy him out.
No use of property which
would be legal if due to a proper motive can become illegal if it is
prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.
|
|
Bradford-Smart v West
Sussex CC [2002] CA |
^[Tort
- negligence - duty of care - just, fair and reasonable - test is the
standard of reasonable body]
D, the
local authority of the school which C attended. C was alleged to
have been bullied on the bus to and from the school and on the estate
where she lived. C suffered psychiatric harm.
Held:
A school could be in breach of duty for failing to take steps to combat
bullying by one pupil against another when they were outside school.
However, a
school would not be in breach of its duty if it failed to take steps which
were unlikely to do much good.
If a
reasonable body of opinion would not have taken any steps then the school
could not be liable for its failure to act.
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] applied
Approving
the words of the trial judge:
"I
have come to the conclusion that granted a school knows that a pupil is
being bullied at home or on the way to and from school, it would not be
practical let alone fair just and reasonable, to impose
upon it a greater duty than to take reasonable steps to prevent that
bullying spilling over into the school ...."
C lost |
|
Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis [1955] HL |
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care - public policy – duty owed in operational matters]
D a
Local Authority employed a teacher who left a 4-year-old child alone for
about ten minutes while she did other things. The child left the classroom
onto a busy road, where he caused a lorry driver to swerve and collide
with a telegraph pole. The lorry driver was killed and his widow sued the
education authority.
Held: The education authority had taken charge of the child and had
a duty to take reasonable care to prevent him from causing harm to others.
C won. |
|
Caparo v Dickman
(1990) HL
|
^[Tort – negligence -
duty of care – development – proximity - foreseeability - 3 stage test]
D
auditors of company accounts. C, Caparo bought shares and then
discovered that the accounts did not show the company had been making a
loss. C alleged that in negligence a duty was owed to Caparo.
Held: Approving a dictum of Brennan J in the High Court of
Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985), that the law should
preferably develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by
analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive extension of
a prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable "considerations
which ought to negative or limit the scope of the duty or the class of
person to whom it is owed".
No duty was owed in those two situations.
Steps to establish duty
of care are;
a) Is there an existing
case, which would hold there to be a duty of care? If not then ask
three questions.
1. Was loss to the
claimant foreseeable?
2. Was there sufficient
proximity between the parties?
3. Is it fair, just and
reasonable to impose a duty of care?
Auditors won |
|
Capital and Counties plc v Hampshire County Council (1996)
CA
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – no duty situations - public policy – no duty owed in operational
matters]
D, a
fire officer negligently ordered the sprinkler system turned off in a
burning building to which the brigade had been called.
Held: There is no public policy immunity in this situation. The
decision was an operational one, not a matter of allocating scarce
resources, and given the brigade's exclusive control over the situation it
would be fair, just and reasonable to impose on them a duty of care to the
property owner.
C won. |
|
Chadwick v British
Railways Board [1967] QBD |
^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - rescuers - nervous shock - duty
owed to rescuers]
D
the railway board responsible for a major train accident caused by their
negligence. C the wife of a volunteer who took part in rescue work
suffered nervous shock and became psychoneurotic as a result of his
experiences.
Held: Damages were recoverable for nervous shock even where the
shock was not caused by fear for oneself or the safety of one's children
and in the circumstances injury by shock was foreseeable.
D
ought to have foreseen the existence of a rescuer and accordingly owed him
a duty.
C won
Also
here |
|
Church of Latter-Day Saints v Yorkshire Fire Authority
[1997] CA
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – no duty situations - public policy – no duty owed in operational
matters]
D, the
fire brigade, was unable to fight a fire at C’s, premises effectively:
three fire hydrants were out of order and another four could not be found.
Held: The damage caused to C by D's negligence was certainly
foreseeable, and there was a sufficiently proximate relationship between
them, but it would not be fair just and reasonable to impose upon D a duty
of care. The fire service is an emergency service, and to allow claims
such as these would impose a burden that would distract it from its proper
task of fighting fires.
It is for the individual
to insure his property against fire, not for the community to do it for
him, and as a matter of public policy, the fire service should not in
general be open to claims of this kind.
C lost. |
|
Clunis v Camden & Islington Health Authority (1998) CA
Whole case, here
|
^[Tort – negligence –
duty – no duty situations – statutory duty - defences – ex turpi causa
non oritur actio]
D a
Local Authority released C from a psychiatric hospital into "community
care"; he then killed a stranger for no evident reasons and was sentenced
to life imprisonment. C sought damages for D's negligence in not providing
adequate treatment, and D asserted ex turpi as a bar to such an
action.
Held: The case should be struck out: the court ought not to allow
itself to be made an instrument to enforce obligations alleged to arise
out of the complainant’s own criminal act.
D won. |
|
Clay v
Crump [1963] CA |
^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - two or more defendants]
A dangerous wall left standing at demolition site fell onto a work-mens'
hut injuring C.
Held: Both the architect and the demolition contractors should
reasonably have foreseen that a dangerous wall might fall and injure
someone, and, accordingly, they were both under a duty to C.
If two or more persons contributed to an accident by their negligence each
must bear a part of the blame, even though one of them had the last
opportunity of preventing it.
C won |
|
Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [1999] CA
Whole case, here
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – no duty situations - public policy – breach – duty of police in
certain situations]
D the
police force (vicariously) responsible for a police inspector who failed
to help C a woman police constable who was attacked and injured by a woman
prisoner at a police station.
Held:
There was a strong public policy consideration that the law should accord
with common sense and public perception, and it would be correct to say
that, the public would be greatly disturbed had the law held that there
was no duty of care. In addition, the public interest would be ill-served
if the common law did not oblige police officers to do their personal best
in situations such as the present. It followed that B had been in breach
of duty in law in not trying to help the claimant. The chief constable was
vicariously liable for that breach, but was not personally in breach.
C won |
|
D
v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust and others [2003] CA
Whole
case, here
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care to child - Human Rights Act - duty owed in some child abuse cases]
Parents sued for
compensation for psychiatric harm resulting from unfounded accusations of
child abuse.
Held:
X v
Bedfordshire County Council [1995] (which denied a duty of care based
on the "fair, just and reasonable" test) could not survive the Human
Rights Act.
A duty of care could sometimes be owed to a
child suspected of being abused. But each case was to be determined on its
individual facts.
Where child abuse is suspected and removing
the child from the parents was justified, no duty of care was owed to the
parents.
One of the three children won |
|
Donachie v The Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police
(CA) [2004] |
Tort - negligence - duty
of care - foreseeability of harm - directly caused or other type of
injury]
D, the police force in which C was serving in the Regional Crime Squad. C
was required to attach a tagging device to the underside of a car believed
to belong to a gang of criminals. The car was behind a public house in
suspects were drinking.
The device failed to activate when attached until the ninth attempt.
Each trip had subjected him to an increased risk of being caught in the
act by the suspects. He became increasingly frightened and feared serious
injury or even death.
As a result of the operation the claimant developed a clinical psychiatric
state, which lead to an acute rise in blood pressure, which caused a
stroke.
Held: It had been a reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s
breach of duty would have caused physical injury to the claimant, although
not of the kind he had actually suffered, and accordingly the defendant
would be liable for the unforeseen psychiatric injury caused by its
negligence.
Established authority provided that in claims for nervous shock or other
forms of psychiatric injury, the application of the test of reasonable
foreseeability differed according to whether the claimant was a ‘primary’
or ‘secondary’ victim.
However, where the court was satisfied that reasonable foreseeability had
been established, whether for physical or psychiatric injury or both, it
was immaterial whether the foreseeable injury caused had been caused
directly or through another form of injury not reasonably foreseeable.
Page v Smith
[1995] applied.
C won |
|
Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) HL
Whole case here
|
^[Tort
– negligence - duty of care – proving fault – to whom duty owed -
neighbour principle]
C, Mrs Donoghue went to Minchella's Wellmeadow Cafe in Paisley with a
friend. The friend ordered ice cream over which part of a bottle of ginger
beer was poured. When the remainder of the ginger beer was poured, it was
found to contain a decomposed snail. Mrs Donoghue became ill through
having consumed contaminated ginger beer.
Held:
"The rule
that you are to love your neighbour become in law, you must not injure
your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? Receives
a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions, which you can reasonably foresee, would be likely to injure
your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to
be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when
I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in
question."
C won.
|
|
East
Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent
[1941] HL |
^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - Board
empowered but not obliged to repair breach]
D
the Board who had statutory powers to repair a breach in the sea wall. C
whose land was flooded during a very high tied breaching the wall.
D
carried out the repairs so inefficiently that the flooding continued for
178 days, instead of 14 days. C's pasture land was seriously damaged.
Held: D was under no obligation to repair the wall or to complete
the work after having begun it, so they were under no liability to C, the
damage suffered by them being due to natural causes.
Where a statutory authority is entrusted with a mere power it cannot be
made liable for any damage sustained by a member of the public by reason
of a failure to exercise the power.
So long as the authority exercises its discretion honestly, it can
determine the method by which, and the time during which, the power shall
be exercised.
C lost |
|
Farrell v Avon Health Authority [2001] QBD |
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – take victim as found – foreseeability of harm]
D (maternity hospital) wrongly told C his baby had died, C suffered
psychiatric harm. C & E went on holiday together and had sexual
intercourse once. There was no romance and the two went their separate
ways.
The baby was born
prematurely C was very excited and immediately went to see the baby. He
was told that the baby had died. The dead baby was brought to him
whom he then handled. After about 20 minutes, the nurses returned and took
the baby away, saying that his baby was still alive and that there had
been a mistake.
C, who had problems with
alcoholism and drug abuse, developed post traumatic stress disorder.
Held:
The claimant was a primary victim and could recover for psychiatric injury
although he had neither sustained nor was it reasonably foreseeable that
he would sustain any physical injury. It was foreseeable that there
was a real risk of him suffering a recognised psychiatric disorder as a
result of the incident.
A claimant would clearly
be a primary victim if he was physically involved in the incident itself
so it was sufficient for the claimant to show that the defendant ought to
have had psychiatric injury in its contemplation. If the foreseeability
test was then fulfilled the defendant had to take the claimant as it found
him.
It followed that the test
to be applied was whether the defendant ought reasonably to have foreseen
that its conduct would expose the claimant to the risk of a recognised
psychiatric disorder on the basis of facts known to the defendant at the
relevant time, that risk being a real risk not merely a possibility.
C was awarded £10,000.
|
|
Froom v Butcher [1975]
CA
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – damages – contributory negligence]
C was
injured in a road traffic accident but was not wearing a seat belt, which
at the time was again widely recommended but not legally required.
Held: C’s damages were reduced by 25%.
For the future a
deduction of 25% where wearing a seat belt would have prevented the
injuries, or 15% where there would still have been some injuries but they
would have been less severe.
|
|
Gates v McKenna (1998)
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care – level of skill required]
D a
stage hypnotist caused psychiatric damage to volunteer from audience.
Held: Level of precautions expected should be that of a ‘reasonably
careful exponent of stage hypnotism’.
|
|
Gibson v Orr CCof Strathclyde [1999]
(OH) Outer House
Scotland
|
^[Tort - negligence - duty of care -
proximity - fair and reasonable]
D
the chief constable whose officers left the scene of a collapsed road
bridge without ensuring there was warning for vehicles on the other side
of the river. C was a passenger in a vehicle drove off a collapsed
bridge.
Held: Three elements had to be applied in personal injury actions
based on a duty of care. Foreseeability, proximity and that it was fair,
just and reasonable that duty be imposed,
Once a constable had taken control of a road traffic situation which
presented a danger, the law regarded that constable as being in such a
relationship with road users as to satisfy the requisite element of
proximity.
It was fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty in the circumstances.
There was no immunity for a police force in performance of civil
operational tasks concerned with human safety on the public roads and
there was no overwhelming dictate of public policy to exclude the
prosecution of such claims.
C won |
|
Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] HL
Whole case
here |
[Negligence – duty of care – private
duty of care not automatically derived from the shadow of a statutory
duty]
D was the local authority responsible under Highways Act 1980 for the
maintenance of a country road. C drove too fast towards the crest of a
hill and collided with a bus suffering very severe injuries. C argued that
D’s failure to paint the word ‘SLOW’ on the road surface constituted a
breach of its duty under the Highways Act and the Road Traffic Act 1988.
She argued that that the statutory duties cast a common law shadow and
created a duty to users of the highway to take reasonable steps in
compliance with the duties in the section.
Held: It was not possible to impose upon a local
authority a common law duty to act based solely on the existence of a
broad public law duty. A common law duty of care could not grow
parasitically out of a statutory duty not intended to be owed to
individuals. The drivers had to take responsibility for the damage they
caused and compulsory third party insurance is intended to ensure that
they would be able to do so. In the instant case, where the complaint was
that the authority had done nothing, the action had to fail.
Stovin v Wise [1996] applied.
C lost |
|
Griffiths v Brown and
Lindsay [1999] QBD |
^[Tort
- negligence - duty of care - no duty owed to passenger in a taxi - not
fair, reasonable nor practicable]
D a taxi driver (Lindsay) set down his intoxicated passenger 30 to 40
yards from his destination, on the other side of the road, but close to a
pedestrian crossing controlled by traffic lights, in the event of the
passenger sustaining injury on being struck by a car (driven by Brown) as
he crossed the road.
Held:
The taxi driver's duty to the passenger came to an end once the passenger
alighted and it was neither reasonable nor practicable to require a taxi
driver to make an assessment of a passenger's state of intoxication before
setting him down.
C lost |
|
Hale v London
Underground Ltd [1993] QBD |
^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - rescuers - psychiatric harm]
D the London Underground board. C a fire-fighter who attended the fire at
King's Cross underground station in November 1987. He entered the station
several times, displaying great bravery. He suffered no significant
physical injury, although he collapsed from exhaustion and had to be
assisted to the surface. He suffered classic post-traumatic stress
disorder and depression.
Held: There was no consideration of duty of care, as liability was
admitted, the case concerned only the amount of damages he could recover
(about £145,000).
|
|
Haley
v London Electricity Board (1965) HL
|
[Tort – negligence - duty
of care - to whom owed – can be class of person - breach - the vulnerable
complainant]
D the Electricity Board, whose workmen were preparing to carry out work on
underground cables. They dug a hole, and in order to give warning of
the danger they laid a long-handled hammer across the pavement. C, a blind
man tripped over the hammer and was injured.
Held: D was liable they had given adequate warning to sighted people,
but it was common knowledge that large numbers of blind people walked
unaided along pavements and the duty of care extended to them as well.
C won |
|
Hall v Simons (2000) HL
Whole case, here
|
^[Tort - negligence
– duty – no duty situations - breach - professionals immunity –
advocates – not a special case]
One of several cases (conjoined cases) on similar issues, where
claimants had done less well than they would but for negligence of their
legal advisers.
Held: It was no longer in the public interest that advocates should
enjoy immunity from being sued for negligent acts concerned with the
conduct of litigation whether in civil or criminal proceedings.
Change of rule on lawyers’ immunity |
|
Harris v Evans (1998) CA
Whole case, here |
