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Blackburn v
Attorney-General (1971) CA |
^[EC Law – Treaty of Rome irrevocable once signed and limits the
sovereignty of United Kingdom - but future parliament not bound]
C sought declarations that on entry into the Common Market, by signing the
Treaty of Rome there would be a breach of the law because the government
would be surrendering, in part, the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament
for ever.
It was accepted by the court that signature of the treaty would be
irreversible and would limit the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.
It was accepted EC regulations and ECJ decisions would automatically
become binding on the United Kingdom.
Held: Treaty-making powers rest in the Crown, acting on the
advice of its Ministers and their actions can not be challenged or
questioned in the courts. No Parliament could bind its successor, so
the Treaty of Rome (which once signed was irrevocable), could be reversed
by a subsequent Parliament.
Lord Salmon said of Parliament's legislative powers that
"...it can enact, amend
and repeal any legislation it pleases."
The appeals were dismissed because the
questions posed were hypothetical.
Also
here |
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Bossa
v Nordstress Ltd [1998] EAT
|
[EC Law - An Act of Parliament
incompatible with EC law can and must be declared invalid and ineffective
to the extent of that incompatibility]
D an airline at
Gatwick refused to employ C as cabin crew because he was Italian. C
complained of unlawful discrimination. Applying s.8 of the Race Relations
Act 1976, the Employment Tribunal said it had no jurisdiction to hear a
complaint in relation to employment wholly or mainly outside
Great Britain.
Held:
C was entitled to a remedy. Art.48 of
the EC treaty (which guarantees freedom of movement irrespective of
nationality) has direct effect, and it was therefore the duty of the
Employment Tribunal to override any provision of the race discrimination
legislation that conflicted with it, and to disapply
s.8 so as to allow C a remedy. |
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British Railways v
Pickin
[1974] HL
 |
[EC Law - An Act of Parliament cannot be
challenged]
D, BR was alleged to have deceived Parliament
in the course of enacting the British Railways Act 1968 - which entitled
them to sell land - through the private bill procedure. C owning property
adjacent to a disused railway claimed that he was entitled to the land no
longer required for running the railway. He claimed the statute was not
valid.
Held:
the pleading be struck out as disclosing no
cause of action.
Lord Reid:
"the idea that a court is entitled
to disregard a provision in an Act of Parliament on any ground must seem
strange and startling to anyone with any knowledge of the history and
law of our constitution."
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Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] CA
 |
[EC Law – preliminary reference
procedure]
D described Babycham as "champagne
perry". C, Champagne makers sought to prevent
use of "champagne". It was suggested that
questions arising from Regulations governing the labelling of wine should
be referred to the ECJ.
Held: Lord Denning MR
using his "incoming tide speech" said the conditions for making a
reference are that the facts of the case should already have been decided,
that the decision of the question referred should be conclusive of the
case, that there had been no previous ruling on the point by the ECJ, and
that the provision in question was not acte
clair.
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Chiron v Murex [1995] CA |
[EC Law – preliminary reference
procedure]
D infringed C’s patent. The trial judge struck
out a defence based on the EC Treaty. Court of Appeal refused a reference
to the ECJ.
Held:
Except where the Court of Appeal was the court of last resort, it was not
obliged to make a reference to the ECJ. The
House of Lords was the court of last resort. If the Court of Appeal
refused leave then the House of Lords should consider, before also
refusing, whether an issue of Community law arose that was needed for its
decision, and take such action as it considered
appropriate. |
|
CILFIT v
Ministry of Health [1983] ECJ |
[EC Law – preliminary reference
procedure]
A dispute over health regulations.
Wool is not expressly listed in the appropriate
part of the Treaties as being a product of animal origin.
Referred to the ECJ.
Held:
Expressly accepting the French concept of acte
clair. No reference to the ECJ
need be made if the question of EC law is
irrelevant, or the relevant provision has already been interpreted by the
ECJ, or the correct application of EC law is so obvious as to leave no
room for doubt. |
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Clean Car
Autoservice
v Wien [1998] ECJ |
[EC Law effect of Treaties]
D set up a branch in
Austria
and appointed a German manager; Austrian domestic law required such
managers to be resident in
Austria.
Held:
This rule amounted to indirect
discrimination violating Art.48 of the Treaty (on free movement of
workers), and could be relied upon by an employer just as by an employee.
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Costa v ENEL [1964] ECJ
 |
[EC Law – overrides any national law
that conflicts with it]
C was affected by the nationalisation of the Italian electricity industry,
and claimed the procedure had been unlawful because EC law
had not been complied with.
Held:
Unlike other international treaties, the treaty instituting the EEC has
created its own order which was integrated with the national orders of the
member states as soon as the treaty came into force, and as such was
binding upon them ... The acceptance by member states of the rights and
obligations arising from the treaty carries with it a clear and permanent
limitation of their sovereign rights, and any subsequent unilateral act
incompatible with the aims of the Community cannot prevail.
-
"the EEC Treaty has created its own legal
system which…became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member
States and which their courts are bound to apply."
-
"Member States have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a
body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves."
-
"The executive force of Community law
cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent
domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of
the Treaty."
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Cowan v
Trésor
Public [1991] ECJ |
[EC Law effect of Treaties]
A British tourist mugged in
Paris
was refused the compensation paid from public
funds to French citizens who were victims of crime.
Held:
Art.7 forbade discrimination between the
nationals of member states, individual member
states may not adopt measures that restrict the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by Community law. |
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DEFRA v Asda
(2003) HL
Whole case
here |
^[EC Law - direct applicably - mechanism for ever
changing Community Law]
D, ASDA were inspected by a DEFRA inspector who found vegetables below
standard, contrary to section 14(1)(a) of the Agriculture and Horticulture
Act 1964. ASDA successfully argued, at first instance, that this was not
an offence known to law.
Held: Asda had contravened EC regulations,
where vegetables do not comply with the minimum requirements laid down by
Commission Regulation (EEC) 79/88. This regulation is ‘binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’, see see Antonio
Muñoz y Cia SA v Frumar Ltd [2003] ECJ.
Compulsory grading and labelling of horticultural
produce existed in this country before the United Kingdom joined the
European Economic Community (the 1964 Act). The 1964 Act was an enabling
Act and subsequent Regulations from time to time laid down the standards
for different fruit and vegetables.
When the United Kingdom joined the European Economic
Community on 1 January 1973 there were already in existence Community
regulations governing the grading of certain types of horticultural
produce. So this country’s law on this topic had to be brought into line
with the existing Community rules, which were “directly applicable”.
Whenever Community grading rules change, the relevant
sections of the 1964 Act apply automatically, they become directly
applicable in this country, this happens automatically.
The mechanism chosen by Parliament for implementing
Community obligations is a matter of legislative choice for Parliament.
Courts should not approach the interpretation of implementing statutes or
regulations as though there were a presumption that they do not embrace
future changes in Community legislation. There is no such presumption.
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Defrenne
v Sabena (No.2) [1976] ECJ
 |
[EC Law effect of Treaties]
D employed C as an air stewardess. C claimed
equal pay with male stewards, and sought to invoke the relevant Treaty
provision.
Held:
She was entitled to do so: subject to the
criteria in Reyners, the Treaties had
horizontal as well as vertical direct effect.
"The prohibition on discrimination between
men and women applies not only to the action of public authorities, but
also extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid
labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals."
An individual can rely on a Treaty article
to enforce rights against another individual in the national courts.
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Duke v GEC
Reliance Ltd [1988] HL
Whole case
here |
[EC Law - previous legislation cannot be
interpreted according to subsequent directives - principles of indirect
effect not applied]
Mrs Duke was required by contract to retire at 60, whereas men in her
company 65. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 was not passed to
give effect to EC Law and could be relied upon.
Held:
The House of Lords did not follow
Marshall as instant case was not a matter of EC Law.
Lord Templeman:
"S.2 (4) ECA 1972 does not…enable or
constrain a British court to distort the meaning of a British statute in
order to enforce against an individual a Community Directive which has
no direct effect between individuals."
This
means that Directives have Vertical not Horizontal effect.
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Edinburgh &
Dalkeith
Railway Co v Wauchope (1842)
Whole case
here |
[Parliament – supremacy – Act cannot be
challenged]
Mr Wauchope claimed that the private Act
obtained by the Railway Company should not be applied as it had been
passed without his having notice of the passing of the Act as required by
Standing Orders.
Held:
Mr Wauchope was unsuccessful in his claim and
Lord Campbell made a statement that has subsequently
been extensively quoted.
"All that a court of
justice can look to is the parliamentary roll: they see that an Act has
passed both Houses of Parliament, and that it has received the royal
assent, and no court of justice can inquire into the manner in which it
was introduced into Parliament, what |