Blackburn v Attorney-General (1971) CA

^[EC Law – Treaty of Rome irrevocable once signed and limits the sovereignty of United Kingdom - but future parliament not bound]
C sought declarations that on entry into the Common Market, by signing the Treaty of Rome there would be a breach of the law because the government would be surrendering, in part, the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament for ever.

It was accepted by the court that signature of the treaty would be irreversible and would limit the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.

It was accepted EC regulations and ECJ decisions would automatically become binding on the United Kingdom.

Held:  Treaty-making powers rest in the Crown, acting on the advice of its Ministers and their actions can not be challenged or questioned in the courts.  No Parliament could bind its successor, so the Treaty of Rome (which once signed was irrevocable), could be reversed by a subsequent Parliament.

Lord Salmon said of Parliament's legislative powers that

"...it can enact, amend and repeal any legislation it pleases."

The appeals were dismissed because the questions posed were hypothetical.

Also here

Bossa v Nordstress Ltd [1998] EAT

[EC Law - An Act of Parliament incompatible with EC law can and must be declared invalid and ineffective to the extent of that incompatibility]
D an airline at Gatwick refused to employ C as cabin crew because he was Italian. C complained of unlawful discrimination. Applying s.8 of the Race Relations Act 1976, the Employment Tribunal said it had no jurisdiction to hear a complaint in relation to employment wholly or mainly outside Great Britain.

Held: C was entitled to a remedy. Art.48 of the EC treaty (which guarantees freedom of movement irrespective of nationality) has direct effect, and it was therefore the duty of the Employment Tribunal to override any provision of the race discrimination legislation that conflicted with it, and to disapply s.8 so as to allow C a remedy.

British Railways v Pickin [1974] HL

[EC Law - An Act of Parliament cannot be challenged]
D, BR was alleged to have deceived Parliament in the course of enacting the British Railways Act 1968 - which entitled them to sell land - through the private bill procedure. C owning property adjacent to a disused railway claimed that he was entitled to the land no longer required for running the railway. He claimed the statute was not valid.

Held: the pleading be struck out as disclosing no cause of action.

Lord Reid:

"the idea that a court is entitled to disregard a provision in an Act of Parliament on any ground must seem strange and startling to anyone with any knowledge of the history and law of our constitution."

Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] CA

[EC Law – preliminary reference procedure]
D described Babycham as "champagne perry". C, Champagne makers sought to prevent use of "champagne". It was suggested that questions arising from Regulations governing the labelling of wine should be referred to the ECJ.

Held: Lord Denning MR using his "incoming tide speech" said the conditions for making a reference are that the facts of the case should already have been decided, that the decision of the question referred should be conclusive of the case, that there had been no previous ruling on the point by the ECJ, and that the provision in question was not acte clair.

Chiron v Murex [1995] CA

[EC Law – preliminary reference procedure]
D infringed C’s patent. The trial judge struck out a defence based on the EC Treaty. Court of Appeal refused a reference to the ECJ.

Held: Except where the Court of Appeal was the court of last resort, it was not obliged to make a reference to the ECJ. The House of Lords was the court of last resort. If the Court of Appeal refused leave then the House of Lords should consider, before also refusing, whether an issue of Community law arose that was needed for its decision, and take such action as it considered appropriate.

CILFIT v Ministry of Health [1983] ECJ

[EC Law – preliminary reference procedure]
A dispute over health regulations. Wool is not expressly listed in the appropriate part of the Treaties as being a product of animal origin. Referred to the ECJ.

Held: Expressly accepting the French concept of acte clair. No reference to the ECJ need be made if the question of EC law is irrelevant, or the relevant provision has already been interpreted by the ECJ, or the correct application of EC law is so obvious as to leave no room for doubt.

Clean Car Autoservice v Wien [1998] ECJ

[EC Law effect of Treaties]
D set up a branch in Austria and appointed a German manager; Austrian domestic law required such managers to be resident in Austria.

Held: This rule amounted to indirect discrimination violating Art.48 of the Treaty (on free movement of workers), and could be relied upon by an employer just as by an employee.

Costa v ENEL [1964] ECJ

[EC Law – overrides any national law that conflicts with it]
C was affected by the nationalisation of the Italian electricity industry, and claimed the procedure had been unlawful because EC law had not been complied with.

Held: Unlike other international treaties, the treaty instituting the EEC has created its own order which was integrated with the national orders of the member states as soon as the treaty came into force, and as such was binding upon them ... The acceptance by member states of the rights and obligations arising from the treaty carries with it a clear and permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, and any subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the aims of the Community cannot prevail.

• "the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which…became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply."

• "Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves."

• "The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty."

Cowan v Trésor Public [1991] ECJ

[EC Law effect of Treaties]
A British tourist mugged in Paris was refused the compensation paid from public funds to French citizens who were victims of crime.

Held: Art.7 forbade discrimination between the nationals of member states, individual member states may not adopt measures that restrict the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law.

DEFRA v Asda (2003) HL

Whole case here

^[EC Law - direct applicably - mechanism for ever changing Community Law]
D, ASDA were inspected by a DEFRA inspector who found vegetables below standard, contrary to section 14(1)(a) of the Agriculture and Horticulture Act 1964. ASDA successfully argued, at first instance, that this was not an offence known to law.

Held: Asda had contravened EC regulations, where vegetables do not comply with the minimum requirements laid down by Commission Regulation (EEC) 79/88. This regulation is ‘binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’, see see Antonio Muñoz y Cia SA v Frumar Ltd [2003] ECJ.

Compulsory grading and labelling of horticultural produce existed in this country before the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (the 1964 Act). The 1964 Act was an enabling Act and subsequent Regulations from time to time laid down the standards for different fruit and vegetables.

When the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973 there were already in existence Community regulations governing the grading of certain types of horticultural produce. So this country’s law on this topic had to be brought into line with the existing Community rules, which were “directly applicable”.

Whenever Community grading rules change, the relevant sections of the 1964 Act apply automatically, they become directly applicable in this country, this happens automatically.

The mechanism chosen by Parliament for implementing Community obligations is a matter of legislative choice for Parliament. Courts should not approach the interpretation of implementing statutes or regulations as though there were a presumption that they do not embrace future changes in Community legislation. There is no such presumption.

 

Defrenne v Sabena (No.2) [1976] ECJ

[EC Law effect of Treaties]
D employed C as an air stewardess. C claimed equal pay with male stewards, and sought to invoke the relevant Treaty provision.

Held: She was entitled to do so: subject to the criteria in Reyners, the Treaties had horizontal as well as vertical direct effect.

"The prohibition on discrimination between men and women applies not only to the action of public authorities, but also extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals."

An individual can rely on a Treaty article to enforce rights against another individual in the national courts.

Duke v GEC Reliance Ltd [1988] HL

Whole case here

[EC Law - previous legislation cannot be interpreted according to subsequent directives - principles of indirect effect not applied]
Mrs Duke was required by contract to retire at 60, whereas men in her company 65.  The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 was not passed to give effect to EC Law and could be relied upon.

Held: The House of Lords did not follow Marshall as instant case was not a matter of EC Law.

Lord Templeman:

"S.2 (4) ECA 1972 does not…enable or constrain a British court to distort the meaning of a British statute in order to enforce against an individual a Community Directive which has no direct effect between individuals."

This means that Directives have Vertical not Horizontal effect.

Edinburgh & Dalkeith Railway Co v Wauchope (1842)

Whole case here

[Parliament – supremacy – Act cannot be challenged]
Mr Wauchope claimed that the private Act obtained by the Railway Company should not be applied as it had been passed without his having notice of the passing of the Act as required by Standing Orders.

Held: Mr Wauchope was unsuccessful in his claim and Lord Campbell made a statement that has subsequently been extensively quoted.

"All that a court of justice can look to is the parliamentary roll: they see that an Act has passed both Houses of Parliament, and that it has received the royal assent, and no court of justice can inquire into the manner in which it was introduced into Parliament, what