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Cases - criminal process
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Dunlop, R v (2006) CA

Malik v Central Criminal Court (2006) Admin

Meill, R v [2007] CA

Robson, R v (2006) CA

Sadler & Daly, v W Midlands Probation Board, QBD (Admin) [2008]

Dunlop, R v (2006) CA


Whole case here

^[Criminal courts - double jeopardy rule - effect of CJA 2003]

D had been acquitted of murder. Following that acquittal he confessed to that murder and was subsequently convicted of perjury. Following a change in the law (CJA 2003) he was retried for Murder. He argued that he would not have made such admission if he had known that he might face retrial (the law not being on the statute book at the time) and therefore it was not in the interests of justice for him to be retried.


Held: The public would rightly be outraged were the exception to the double jeopardy rule not to be applied in the present case simply on the basis that D would not have made the confessions that he did had he appreciated that they might lead to his retrial.


The court could see no injustice in allowing a retrial. As for the sentence that D has served for perjury, that was imposed as punishment for lying under oath. It may be that the sentence reflected the consequence of the perjury, namely D’s acquittal of murder, and that for this reason it should be taken into account, to some extent, when determining the minimum term to be served should D now be convicted of that crime. That is a matter that will fall for consideration if and when a judge comes to sentence D for the offence of murder.


Comment: D was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, details here.

Malik v Central Criminal Court (2006) Admin


Whole case here

^[Criminal Courts - bail]

D, a suspected terrorist, objected to his bail application being heard in private and without him being present, as normal at The Old Bailey. Bail was refused. D applied for Judicial Review.

Held: The starting point is that, other things being equal, court hearings should take place in public. Whether a bail application is heard in open court was a public obligation, it should start from the fundamental presumption in favour of open justice.

Case remitted to hear the bail application in public and whether to grant bail.
Comment: Mr Justice Gray for the court used the following quotes:
Viscount Haldane LC:

"the broad principle… that the Courts of this country must, as between parties, administer justice in public"

Lord Halsbury:

"I am of the opinion that every Court of Justice is open to every subject of the King… I believe this has been the rule, at all events, for some centuries".

Bentham's dictum:

“Publicity is the very soul of justice”

The historian Hallam:

"Civil liberty in this kingdom has two distinct guarantees; the open administration of justice … and the right of Parliament … to inquire into, and obtain redress of public grievances. Of these the first is by far the most indispensable …".

Meill, R v [2007] CA


Whole case here

^[Criminal Courts - rule against double jeopardy]
D was acquitted of murder, despite having confessed to being the murderer to different people. He pleaded guilty to perjury, but later retracted his confession. The prosecution subsequently applied for a retrial of the respondent under s 76 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

The prosecution contended that the conviction for perjury and the confession statement amounted to new and compelling evidence for the purposes of s 78 of the 2003 Act such that a re-trial ought to be ordered.

An issue arose as to the effect of s 74 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which seemed to establish, unless he proved to the contrary, that the respondent did in fact commit perjury in denying that he killed the deceased, and thus that he was, in fact, the murderer.

Held: The application would be refused.

Section 78 of the 2003 Act required the court to form its own view as to whether the respondent's conviction for perjury on a guilty plea was, in fact, compelling, reliable and highly probative evidence that he was the murderer.

The admission was contrary to the forensic evidence, and other details. Having regard to those demonstrable untruths in the confession statement, that statement, and the perjury conviction were not compelling, reliable and highly probative evidence.

Prosecution's application for a re-trial refused

R v Dunlop [2007] distinguished.

Robson, R v (2006) CA



Whole case here


^[Criminal Courts – determining the age of the defendant for sentencing]
D sexually assaulted a woman and by the time he was convicted he was 17 years old. The Youth Court that convicted him committed him to the Crown Court for sentencing. When he was produced for sentencing, he had turned 18 year.

Held: The age of an offender for the purpose of determining which of the statutory sentencing regimes under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Chapter 5 applied to him was the offender's age at the date of conviction.

Sadler & Daly, W Midlands Probation Board v, [2008]QBD (Admin)

[Criminal Courts - sentence continues during appeal process]
The fact that a person has lodged an appeal against either conviction or sentence does not amount in itself to a reasonable excuse not to comply with a community order.



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