Dunlop, R v
Malik v Central Criminal Court (2006) Admin
Meill, R v  CA
Robson, R v (2006) CA
Sadler & Daly, v W Midlands Probation Board, QBD (Admin) 
v (2006) CA
courts - double jeopardy rule - effect of CJA 2003]
had been acquitted of murder. Following that acquittal he confessed to
that murder and was subsequently convicted of perjury. Following a change
in the law (CJA 2003) he was retried for Murder. He argued that he would
not have made such admission if he had known that he might face retrial
(the law not being on the statute book at the time) and therefore it was
not in the interests of justice for him to be retried.
Held: The public would rightly be outraged were the exception to
the double jeopardy rule not to be applied in the present case simply on
the basis that D would not have made the confessions that he did had he
appreciated that they might lead to his retrial.
The court could see no injustice in allowing a retrial. As for the
sentence that D has served for perjury, that was imposed as punishment for
lying under oath. It may be that the sentence reflected the consequence of
the perjury, namely D’s acquittal of murder, and that for this reason it
should be taken into account, to some extent, when determining the minimum
term to be served should D now be convicted of that crime. That is a
matter that will fall for consideration if and when a judge comes to
sentence D for the offence of murder.
Comment: D was convicted of murder and sentenced to life
Malik v Central
Criminal Court (2006) Admin
Courts - bail]
D, a suspected terrorist, objected to his bail application being heard in
private and without him being present, as normal at The Old Bailey. Bail
was refused. D applied for Judicial Review.
Held: The starting point is that, other things being equal, court
hearings should take place in public. Whether a bail application is heard
in open court was a public obligation, it should start from the
fundamental presumption in favour of open justice.
Case remitted to hear the bail application in public and whether to
Comment: Mr Justice Gray for the court used the following quotes:
Viscount Haldane LC:
"the broad principle… that the Courts of this country must, as between
parties, administer justice in public"
"I am of the opinion that every Court of Justice is open to every subject
of the King… I believe this has been the rule, at all events, for some
“Publicity is the very soul of justice”
The historian Hallam:
"Civil liberty in this kingdom has two distinct guarantees; the open
administration of justice … and the right of Parliament … to inquire into,
and obtain redress of public grievances. Of these the first is by far the
most indispensable …".
Meill, R v
^[Criminal Courts - rule against double
D was acquitted of murder, despite having confessed to being the murderer
to different people. He pleaded guilty to perjury, but later retracted his
confession. The prosecution subsequently applied for a retrial of the
s 76 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
The prosecution contended that the conviction for perjury and the
confession statement amounted to new and compelling evidence for the
purposes of s 78 of the 2003 Act such that a re-trial ought to be ordered.
An issue arose as to the effect of
s 74 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which seemed to
establish, unless he proved to the contrary, that the respondent did in
fact commit perjury in denying that he killed the deceased, and thus that
he was, in fact, the murderer.
Held: The application would be refused.
Section 78 of the 2003 Act required the court to form its own view as to
whether the respondent's conviction for perjury on a guilty plea was, in
fact, compelling, reliable and highly probative evidence that he was the
The admission was contrary to the forensic evidence, and other details.
Having regard to those demonstrable untruths in the confession statement,
that statement, and the perjury conviction were not compelling, reliable
and highly probative evidence.
Prosecution's application for a re-trial refused
R v Dunlop 
Robson, R v
Courts – determining the age of the defendant for sentencing]
D sexually assaulted a woman and by the time he was convicted he was 17
years old. The Youth Court that convicted him committed him to the Crown
Court for sentencing. When he was produced for sentencing, he had turned
Held: The age of an offender for the purpose of determining which
of the statutory sentencing regimes under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Chapter 5 applied to him was the offender's age at the date of conviction.
Sadler & Daly, W Midlands Probation Board v,
[Criminal Courts - sentence continues
during appeal process]
The fact that a person has lodged an appeal against either conviction or
sentence does not amount in itself to a reasonable excuse not to comply
with a community order.