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Is there a problem? |
Two women a week die as a result of domestic violence
Hansard 14 July 2003.
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Attempts to reform the law |
There have been unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation to reform the
law on provocation, for example:
A
Bill to amend the Homicide Act 1957 in December 1991 failed;
Hansard,
here.
A
Bill to amend the Homicide Act 1957 in May 1994 failed; Hansard,
here. |
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March 2004, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer proposes
reform |
Referring to the sentencing advisory panel sentencing of manslaughter by
reason of provocation, particularly in domestic settings
Full speech
here. |
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Partial defence |
If provocation is raised as a defence it only reduces the conviction from
murder to manslaughter, although provoked it implies that the defendant
intended to kill.
Although often used with the defence of diminished responsibility it
closes off other explanations as to how the deceased died.
In other cases, for example assault, provocation is not a defence but can
be taken into account in sentencing.
If there were no mandatory sentence for murder it would not be necessary
for this defence at all, only as a plea of mitigation. |
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Role of Parliament |
It should be for Parliament to amend the law, it was Parliament that
enacted the Homicide Act 1957. |
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Justice for Women a campaign group propose self-preservation
defence: |
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Death of a child or vulnerable adult |
The new offence of familial
homicide, introduced in the
Domestic
Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004, closes a legal loophole that
allows those jointly accused of the murder of a child or vulnerable adult
to escape justice by remaining silent or blaming each other.
This measure puts a clear legal responsibility on adult household members
who have frequent contact with a child or vulnerable adult to take
reasonable steps to protect the child or vulnerable adult if they knew or
should have known they were at significant risk of serious physical harm
from members of that household.
The reasonable steps that an adult household member is expected to take
will vary according to the circumstances of the case and ultimately it
will be for the jury to decide if the person acted reasonably.
The public information leaflet is available at
http://www.ncvcco.org/files/157.pdf
Domestic violence accounts for
16 per cent of all crime (Crime in
England and Wales 2003/4, Home Office
2004). |
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The history of provocation |
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History |
Provocation has its origins in the common law where the courts allowed a defendant
to evade a murder conviction by arguing that their
victim did or said something that made them lose control.
It was given statutory form in 1957. |
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The case of Madeleine Humes,
who was killed by her husband Les |
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D a solicitor killed Madeleine after she
confessed to an affair with her karate instructor |
She died after being stabbed by her husband 12 times in 15 minutes in
front of her children. Their teenage daughter tried to seize the knife
from Humes as he repeatedly stabbed her mother. Humes, who said in court
he 'just saw this red mist', got seven years for manslaughter - leaving
his wife's family furious.
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Paula Watt, Madeleine's sister |
"If Madeleine had survived and he had been
charged only with attempted murder or GBH, he would have got more of a
sentence than that, but he killed her, so he gets less. What kind of
signal is that sending to people? All the way through, Les was seen as a
victim - Maddie wasn't heard at all"
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Solicitor Harriet Wistrich, of Justice for
Women |
"We call it the "nagging and shagging" defence - classically, it will
be either "she was sleeping with someone else" or that she nagged him, but
if it is simply that she is leaving you, is that enough of an excuse for
murder?"
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Other cases ....
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Joseph McGrail, in 1992 received a
suspended sentence for kicking his wife to death |
Pleaded provocation on the grounds that she was an alcoholic and swore at
him. The judge said the dead woman "would have tried the patience of a
saint".
Rajinder Bisla, married for 18 years, strangled his 'nagging' wife, Abnash,
received an 18-month suspended sentence for manslaughter due to
provocation. |
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Women who kill treated
differently from men |
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Sexual bias |
The discrimination against women in the use
of this defence is apparent in the arguments for the pardon of
Ruth Ellis (the last woman to hang in the UK).
Ellis killed her lover in a rage but
provocation was never raised at her trial.
The more recent cases of
Kiranjit Ahluwalia
and
Sara Thornton highlighted the problems of the requirement for "a
sudden and temporary loss of self-control", which is essentially a male
response.
Lack of physical strength is cited as one
reason why women do not respond with immediate violence to provocation.
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Baroness Helena Kennedy, QC |
In her book "Eve Was Framed, Women and British Justice" says women
experience, 'a snapping in slow motion, the final surrender of frayed
elastic'.
There is much
public criticism of the way women are treated, for example the case of
Rena Salmon. |
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Ahluwalia's conviction reduced to
manslaughter |
Ahluwalia's final appeal succeeded on the
grounds of diminished responsibility not provocation. However the
fatal act could have been a last minute loss of control.
In
Thornton's case it was accepted that "battered woman's syndrome" could
be taken into account.
Emma Humphrey's appeal succeeded because the
cumulative effects of many years of abuse were taken into account.
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Is it a licence to kill to "water-down" the
defence for women? |
Battered woman's syndrome is seen as a
"licence to kill".
This avoids the fact that as provocation is
only a partial defence the judge can inflict any sentence, including life,
and she can be sentenced accordingly.
Lord Ashley attempted to introduce a
Bill in 1991 to reform the law and it is interesting to note that the
Speaker had to call the house to order while other honourable members
ignored the debate, demonstrating what Ashley called chauvinism.
He said that the "The fallacy at the
heart of Mr. Justice Devlin's dictum [in
Duffy] is that it failed to appreciate that many people cannot
regain normal self-control soon after brutality 'many people cannot regain
normal self-control after brutality."
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Advantages and disadvantages
of reform or even abolishing the defence of provocation |
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Advantages |
Disadvantages |
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It would acknowledge that society
does not accept extreme violence as a response to actions or insults
which do not include physical threats.
It would eliminate the historical
anomaly in the law that excuses killings based on anger.
It would alleviate the fear that the
defence is being used by men to kill women.
It would would remove the problems
associated with complicated charges to the jury.
It would resolve the inconsistency of
applying the offence of manslaughter to killing with intent.
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The defence might be useful for women in
situations of domestic violence who kill in self-defence but with
excessive force in response to the provocation of physical or verbal
abuse.
There could be an increase in acquittals
by juries who no longer have an alternative to a murder condemnation
in cases where they view the accused as morally less worthy of blame.
Murder might be considered an
inappropriate term for killing under provocation. |
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Difficulties for the jury |
The questions put before a jury on the issue
of provocation can be difficult to answer.
For example, in R v Raven (1982), the
22-year-old defendant had a mental age of nine, and had lived in squats
for about three years of his life. The jury was directed to consider the
reasonable man as having lived the same type of life as Raven with
his retarded development and mental age.
However, it is difficult to see how this
problem can be avoided. Without some form of 'reasonable person' test,
every little insult, which might cause a loss of temper, could be raised
as provocation.
Equally, a reasonable person test which did
not require jurors to take into account the characteristics of the accused
would result in, for example, teenagers being expected to exhibit adult
standards of behaviour, or the injustice seen in
Bedder v DPP.
(Elliott & Quinn 4th Edition).
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Problems with provocation
raised by The Law Commission |
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The defence is inherently contradictory |
The defence has
internal contradictions because it is a compromise. It raises the question
whether a reasonable person should ever respond to provocation by killing.
The "objective"
requirement, "whether a reasonable man would have done as the defendant
did," has been considered by the House of Lords / Privy Council four times
in the last twenty five years, culminating in
Smith (Morgan)
with a 3:2 split. This demonstrates fundamental
problems with the concept of the "reasonable man."
Again in 2005 this was revisited in
Jersey v Holley [2005] PC. |
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The wide meaning of provocative conduct |
The fact that
under
section 3 of the 1957 Act there is no limit to what conduct is capable
of "provoking" a defendant to kill means that completely innocent conduct
on the part of the deceased may be regarded as provocation.
This is contrary
to one of the fundamental rationales of the defence, which is that the
victim "contributed" to the defendant’s lethal loss of temper.
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The defence of provocation elevates the
emotion of anger over other emotions such as fear, despair, compassion and
empathy |
It is questionable
whether, in moral terms, a killing is necessarily less culpable when
performed in anger as a result of provocation.
Indeed there is an
argument that it is morally unsustainable for anger and sudden loss of
self-control to found a form of defence to murder. |
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Sexual bias |
By providing a
partial defence where the response to provocation is to kill in sudden
anger, but not where a killing is planned, the defence favours men who
react in violent anger over women who kill with premeditation from fear
rather than rage. |
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It is difficult to distinguish revenge
killings, so as to exclude them from the defence |
As a result of the
courts stretching the requirement of "loss of self control" in order to
accommodate battered woman’s syndrome cases, there is no clear test for
distinguishing a "provoked" killing from a "revenge" killing.
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The defence blames the victim of the murder |
It blames the
victim for the defendant’s inability to exercise control. In court the
deceased cannot answer defence assertions.
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Absence of a general standard of required
self-control |
The effect of the
majority judgement in
Smith (Morgan)
is to reduce the threshold of self-control that
individuals are entitled to demand of all members of society. |
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Practical difficulties with the operation of
the defence of provocation |
The fact that the
burden of proof remains on the prosecution in cases of provocation, but is
borne by the defence in relation to diminished responsibility, may cause
confusion in cases where a defendant runs both defences.
It is also
confusing to juries that in cases where the defence do not suggest, and no
sensible person could suggest, that an ordinary person might have acted as
the defendant is alleged to have done, the judge nevertheless has to give
directions to the jury about the law of provocation if there is any
evidence that the defendant acted in loss of self-control. |
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Law Commission |
Their final report which contains all you need
to know about all partial defences to murder is
here.
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The defence of provocation, was so
beset by “moral and theoretical difficulties” that it should be scrapped
(the Law Commission in 2003) |
“There’s a problem with the law on provocation that institutionalises the idea
that an attack by a man on his wife is her fault,” the Solicitor-General Harriet
Harman said recently. She argued that this law meant the victim was
characterised as “a nag or a bad mother”.
The Law Commission quoted the “penetrating judgment” of the late Professor Sir
John Smith in R v. Smith (Morgan) (2001), which concluded with the words: “What
a muddle.”
If it was abolished the Government would have to take a look at, and possibly
scrap, the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for murder. The judge could
take into account excessive force in self-defence when passing sentence. The
consultation process comes to an end on 31 January 2004.
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