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Mens Rea, the guilty mind |
From the
Latin, Actus non-facit reus
nisi mens sit rea |
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Definition of mens rea |
The term mens rea
refers to the mental element in the definition of a crime. This is not
some abstract mental process; it refers to specific words in the charge or
indictment. |
|
These
words include 'intentionally', 'knowingly', 'recklessly', 'maliciously',
or 'negligently',
'fraudulently',
'suffering', ‘dishonestly’ and so forth. |
Each word has a
different meaning, it is not possible to simply identify them as mens
rea and leave it like that.
If Parliament intended mens rea in an offence it will often
include mens rea words
somewhere else in the statute.
The courts assume that if Parliament deliberately left the word out, the
offence is one of strict liability by ‘necessary implication’. |
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Transferred malice |
If the defendant, with the
mens rea of a particular crime, does an act, which causes the actus
reus of the same crime, he is guilty, although the result, in some
respects, is an unintended one. |
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Latimer (1886) |
D, a soldier during an argument with
another man C in a pub, took off his belt swung it at C, missed and
wounded the landlady V.
Held: the intention to strike
C was transferred to V under the doctrine of transferred malice.
Guilty |
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When malice
is not transferred. |
However, if the defendant,
with the mens rea of a particular crime, does an act that causes the
actus reus
of another crime, he will not be liable under
the doctrine of transferred malice.
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|
Pembliton (1874) |
D was ejected from a pub and became
involved in a fight. He threw a stone at the group of men he had been
fighting, missed them but broke the pub window behind them.
Held: His "malice" in
intending to strike another person could not be transferred to an
intention to break the window.
Not guilty |
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Coincidence of actus reus and mens
rea |
See
contemporaneity, here |
|
Ignorance or
mistake of a civil law obligation can negate mens rea of a crime |
Ignorance of the criminal law is no defence, but a mistake
of civil law may be a defence to a criminal charge, provided it negates
the mens rea for the offence in question |
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Mens Rea - what it is. |
Mens Rea
(the guilty mind or wrongful intention) differs from crime to crime.
The intention of a criminal
committing a theft is different from that of a rapist.
To be criminally liable, a person must
have intended to do wrong or have acted in a reckless and negligent manner
knowing that his actions would cause the result complained of.
A terrorist, who puts a bomb on a plane
and kills all the passengers, would have no defence by claiming that he
did not intend to kill anyone, and he only intended to damage the plane.
Such an act is so reckless, and the likelihood of death so foreseeable,
that it is inferred that the criminal intention is present. |
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When
considering murder, the House of Lords has ruled that intent to kill or
inflict serious bodily harm is necessary to establish 'malice
aforethought'. |
Malice
aforethought means 'intention'. However, foresight of the probable
consequences of an act does not automatically mean the consequences were
intended.
A line of cases demonstrates this:
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|
R v Moloney
(1985) HL |
D received a friendly challenge by
his stepfather to see who was "quicker on the draw" with shotguns. Both
men were drunk, but good friends. Moloney shot and killed his stepfather,
although he claimed he had no intention to do so and did not appreciate
that the gun was aimed at the victim.
Held: Moloney was not guilty
of murder as a person only intends the result of an act if his purpose is
to bring about that result. As Moloney did not intend to kill his
stepfather, he was not guilty of murder.
Guilty of manslaughter. |
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R v Hancock
and Shankland (1985) HL |
The defendants (DD) were striking
miners. They pushed blocks of concrete from a bridge above a road, which
landed on a windscreen of a taxi carrying a miner to work. The concrete
killed the driver of the taxi and the defendants were charged with murder.
They claimed that they had not intended to kill or injure anyone, but
merely to block the road.
Held: In such cases the
probability of death or injury arising from the act done is important,
because "if the likelihood that death or serious injury will result is
high, the probability of that result may be seen as overwhelming evidence
of the existence of the intent to kill or injure."
Guilty of manslaughter. |
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R v Nedrick
(1986) HL |
The court considered that in such cases a person would
only be guilty if his actions are virtually certain to result in death
or serious harm, regardless of intent. |
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R v Woollin
[1998] HL |
The House of Lords approved
Nedrick, and made a few refinements to the direction a judge should
give the jury. |