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Dworkin: |
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Principles |
Are propositions that describe
rights |
|
Policies |
Are propositions that describe
goals |
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Arguments of policy |
Consist of
recommendations that something be done because it is necessary in order to
secure some social goal.
Arguments
of principle will require that something be done because it secures some
individual or group right. |
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Rights are trumps |
They
protect individuals from interference by society in its pursuit of certain
goals.
The courts
are important vehicles for the protection of rights, and in the process of
adjudication, judges should base their decisions on principles that
specify rights, rather than on policies, which are propositions about
social goals.
Where a
judge is confronted with a 'hard case', i.e. a case to which no
specific rule of law applies clearly, then the judge will search through
the various other standards available in the law in order to determine the
question 'who has a right to win?'
These
standards constitute the moral fabric of society and the court will always
be able to find the right answer and use this to protect the rights of
individuals.
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The supremacy of rights |
Rights, once established,
cannot be extinguished and strong rights should always override any
considerations of policy where there is a conflict. However, the operation of
certain rights may be restricted where some major benefit is to be
acquired for all the members of society. |
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Examination focus |
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Textbook writers frequently
criticise courts’ decisions. |
Students
too can criticise precedents and the consequences of applying the
precedents to the given problem.
It may be
useful to use the three Ps;
P1: Does
the decision conflict with a principle of law?
P2: Does
the decision run counter to a declared policy objective?
P3: Will
the decision cause problems in practice?
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|
The UK constitution consists of
bits and pieces, moulded and shaped by practical experience, was also
perhaps to be expected in a country where empiricism had flourished |
The
characteristic approach to problems of public policy was pragmatic,
as demonstrated in legal development by the common law and in the
constitutional sphere by incrementalism.
The
‘building’ which Jennings described as ‘added to, patched and
generally reconstructed’ was not architect designed, but was put together
by different builders at different times, called in to carry out repairs
or to construct extensions.
There had
been no grand plans. |
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Examples of Judges using policy
as an excuse for their decision |
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'Yorkshire Ripper' |
Both the
defence and prosecution wanted the trial to proceed on the basis of
diminished responsibility, and were backed by well-respected psychiatric
experts. But the judge refused and Sutcliffe was eventually convicted of
murder.
Since
Sutcliffe has spent his sentence in solitary confinement in a mental
hospital, it looks as though the lawyers and psychiatrists were right, but
as Helena Kennedy QC has pointed out, it appears that public policy
demanded that a man accused of such a notorious string of crimes should,
if guilty, bear the label of murderer.
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Shaw v DPP [1961] |
Other
Judges are of the opinion that this is a matter for Parliament, not the
courts. For an example of this viewpoint we may refer to the dissenting
judgement of Lord Slynn in the Brown case [1993].
"It is a
matter of policy in an area where social and moral factors are
extremely important and where attitudes can change. In my opinion it is
a matter of policy for the legislature to decide. If society
takes the view that this kind of behaviour, even though sought after and
done in private, is either so new or so extensive or so undesirable that
it should be brought for the first time within the criminal law, then it
is for the legislature to decide."
Here was a
policy decision pure and simple.
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Morgans v Launchbury [1973] |
Failed claim against wife who
owned car involved in accident when friend was driving. It was said that
it was not for the courts to make law where social policy matters are
involved.
|
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Ashton v Turner and Another (1980) |
A
participant to a crime does not owe a duty of care as a matter of public
policy to a partner in the crime.
Claimant
and defendants had been drinking together and the second defendant allowed
Turner to drive his car without insurance. Ashton and Turner later
committed burglary and when driving away from the crime had an accident,
which injured Ashton (the passenger).
Turner pleaded guilty to dangerous
driving and driving while drunk. Ashton claimed damages against both
defendants and the court held that, as a matter of public policy
the claimant was not owed a duty of care when injured during the
commission of a crime. The court also held that Turner could successfully
plead the defence of volenti non fit
injuria.
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Parliament removes discretion from judges |
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The Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires the courts to apply the following
sentencing principles to any murders for which sentence is passed on or
after 18 December 2003: |
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Whole life will be the starting point for
murderers aged 21 or over in respect of: |
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Multiple murders (two or more) that show a
substantial degree of premeditation, involve abduction of the victim
prior to the killing or are sexual or sadistic;
-
murder of a child following abduction or
involving sexual or sadistic conduct;
-
terrorist murder; and
-
murder where the offender has been
previously convicted of murder.
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Second level attracting a starting point of
30 years for: |
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Murders of police and prison officers
during course of duty;
-
murder involving the use of a firearm or
explosive;
-
killing done for gain (burglary, robbery
etc includes professional or contract killing);
-
killing intended to defeat ends of justice
(killing witness);
-
race/religion/sexual orientation
motivated;
-
single sadistic or sexual murder of an
adult;
-
and multiple murders (other than those
above).
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Any other murders
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Any other murders will have a 15 year starting point. |
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"Life means life" to the Home Secretary, but not to judges.
|
In a dispute with judges that has continued since 2002, David Blunkett
reminded judges of their place.
"I'm putting the situation back to what most sensible people thought it
should be, which is that Parliament lays down the rules and the
judges apply them,"
The Bar Council put it even more bluntly when they accused him of
"trying to institutionalise the grip of the executive around the neck of
the judiciary".
In a letter to The Times, retired Law Lord Lord Ackner warned that the
Home Secretary's attempts to "bludgeon" judges was "doomed to failure", as
they would retain the last word in sentencing.
What would happen, when push came to shove and the Home Office demanded
that a murder should carry 30 years and the judges impose 10?
All that ministers could do was put pressure on the Attorney-General
to appeal to the Court of Appeal, which Lord Ackner believed would back
the judge anyway.
The Law Lord also predicted that judges would ignore the new guidelines.
"They can, and I think they should, and they would" he predicted. |