Juries - verdicts

Alexander Pope 300 years ago, "And wretches hang that jurymen may dine".
Jury verdicts
Jury secrecy and misconduct	The common law rule holds that after the verdict has been delivered evidence directed to matters intrinsic to the deliberations of jurors is inadmissible in any court, this includes the Court of Appeal and House of Lords. This rule is strengthened by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which makes it contempt of court to try to obtain information from a juror about the verdict. The Act was passed when it appeared that the common law rule was being compromised. R v Connor and Mirza (Conjoined Appeals) [2004] HL Jury misconduct during the trial can be reported to the judge who will deal with it. After the verdict has been given he has no such power and it is the responsibility of the Court of Appeal to quash a conviction if it is unsafe. Gregory v United Kingdom (1997) and Sander v United Kingdom (2000) The confidentiality is not temporary: it is permanent and not capable of waiver A court cannot be in contempt of itself: per Lord Hobhouse in R v Connor and Mirza (Conjoined Appeals) [2004] HL The European Court of Human Rights have endorsed the English system in Gregory v UK (1997). Lord Steyn in Connor and Mirza took a different view, but was in the minority: "In my view it would be an astonishing thing for the ECHR to hold, when the point directly arises before it, that a miscarriage of justice may be ignored in the interests of the general efficiency of the jury system. The terms of article 6(1) of the European Convention, the rights revolution, and fifty years of development of human rights law and practice, would suggest that such a view would be utterly indefensible."
Four reasons for secrecy	There are 4 main reasons why jury deliberations, once a verdict is announced, should remain secret. Secrecy promotes candour and the kind of full and frank debate that is essential to this type of collegial decision making, without fear of public ridicule, contempt or hatred. The need to ensure finality of the verdict, when formally announced, carries the finality and authority of a legal pronouncement. The need to protect jurors from harassment, censure and reprisals. Public discussion of jury deliberations might undermine the system. This principle was affirmed in R v Connor and Mirza (Conjoined Appeals) [2004] HL
Following R v Mirza [2004] HL	Lord Woolf issued an amendment to the Practice Direction, which in a nutshell says that jurors should bring their concerns to the attention of the judge before the end of the trial and not afterwards.
Unanimous and majority verdicts	A jury is required to come to an unanimous verdict. When the jurors, after full debate and discussion, are unable to agree on a verdict and are deadlocked with differences of opinion that appear to be irreconcilable, it is said to be a "hung jury". The result is a mistrial. To prevent mistrials, majority verdicts of 10-2 are allowed to prevent a hung jury. There is no limit as to how quickly a jury can decide, but the jury must deliberate for 2 hours with an additional 10 minutes 'settling down' time before the judge can allow a majority verdict (longer at the discretion of the judge). Failure to allow such time will be a procedural error and result in acquittal (see R v Black, Court of Appeal, 6 February 2008). Permissible verdicts: 12 jurors = 10-2, 11-1 11 jurors = 10-1 (if one has been discharged e.g. ill) 10 jurors = 9-1 (two discharged) 9 jurors = unanimous (three discharged).
Three stages
Before the jury is empanelled	This involves the random selection of jurors and is covered by the selection procedure and cannot be interfered with except within the defined rules of "challenges". What is said by jurors at this stage may be reviewed by the trial judge.
During the trial before verdict is given	The trial judge deals with irregularities by investigating any reports (or his own observations) and dealing with it appropriately across a range of options, If the jury as a whole is fatally compromised, the judge will discharge them. Where only one particular juror is fatally compromised, the judge will discharge that juror and the trial will proceed with the remaining jurors. In less serious cases the judge will deal with the matter by giving the jury appropriate directions. including discharging the juror in question or the whole jury.
After the verdict is given	Any evidence of jury impartiality is always inadmissible under the common law secrecy rule no matter how compelling that evidence might be.
Influences on juries
Intrinsic influences	The House of Lords and Court of Appeal have consistently refused to entertain appeals based on the allegation of a juror, or anyone else, made after the verdict, that during their deliberations other jurors showed bias, failed to apply the judge's directions or otherwise acted improperly e.g. tossing a coin, or drawing lots to decide guilt or innocence. If a juror held the view that the deliberations were imperfect, then the time to make it known was before the verdict was returned - either by sending a note to the judge, or by speaking to the jury bailiff or by declaring the objection in open court (R v Connor and Mirza (Conjoined Appeals) [2004] HL).
Extrinsic influences	Where the allegation is that the jury has been subjected to some improper influence from outside, such as bribery or intimidation, appeal courts have been prepared to admit evidence relating to that allegation, investigate the matter and set aside the jury's verdict. Since proof of the improper extrinsic influence will be sufficient by itself to make the jury's verdict unsafe, no question of admitting evidence as to actual deliberations of the jurors need arise. For the most part at least, such cases are relatively easy to deal with. Extrinsic influences would also include bringing in a ouija board.
Perverse decisions (Jury Equity)
Juries do not have to give reasons for their decision	This allows a jury return verdicts that are not in accordance with the law or facts, these are sometimes called "perverse decisions".
Jury Equity (nullification)	When a jury takes into account factors that a judge would not and thereby comes to a different (wrong?) decision in law it is often referred to as "jury equity". "Jury equity" could be summed up as the refusal of juries to apply the law when they believe that to follow it would lead to an unjust verdict. They are not told of their right to come to such a verdict. The word equity is drawn from the "law of equity" which is is about "justice and fairness"
Jury flying in the face of the facts to the defendants disadvantage	The Court of a Appeal will interfere with a verdict in a criminal case if it is satisfied that no reasonable jury, who had applied their minds properly to the facts of the case, could have arrived at the conclusion which was reached. The corollary of that being that if a reasonable jury applying its mind could have reached the same conclusion, then there could be no complaint on the ground of discrepancy.
Jury's flying in the face of the facts to the defendants advantage	Juries were notoriously reluctant to convict of bigamy where this was obviously a poor person's substitute for a rich person's divorce, and were more likely to decide (on no evidence) that the deserting spouse had in fact died. Also, where a young man was charged with unlawful sex with a girl under 16, the girl having obviously consented, juries eagerly accepted his "reasonable belief" that she was over that age even though his reasons might have been extremely flimsy. In civil cases (not criminal) jury verdicts, if perverse, can be set aside by the CofA (Grobbelaar v The Sun (2002) HL ).
Examples of perverse verdicts
Blythe, R v (1998)	Despite a ruling from the judge that there was no defence available to D who was cultivating cannabis with intent to supply to his wife who was dying with multiple sclerosis, the jury disregarded this instruction and found D not guilty.
Davies, R v (1999)	Mr Davies was cleared by a jury of possessing the cannabis to ease the pain of a back injury sustained in a fall.
Melchett, R v (2000)	Lord Melchett who was the leader of a large group entered a field and destroyed part of a crop of genetically modified maize, was acquitted by a jury.
Owen, R v (1992)	T had killed D’s son by careless driving, D injured T with shotgun. The jury acquitted him and some members later congratulated him on what he had done.
Ponting, R v [1985]	D revealed secret information about the sinking of the ship "General Belgrano" during the Falklands War, despite the judge's clear direction that D's conduct did amount to an offence, the jury acquitted him. BBC report here
Randle & Pottle, R v (1991)	DD assisted a famous spy George Blake escape from prison and wrote a book about the escape. They were acquitted by the jury.
Schot & Barclay, R v [1997]	DD were two jurors who were unable to follow the mass of evidence during a 17-day counterfeiting trial. DD refused to return a verdict at all.
Wilson, Kronlid, Needham, Zeltna, R v (1996)	Four women caused £1½m worth of damage to a Hawk fighter jet that was to be sold to Indonesia, where it would be used against the people fighting for independence in East Timor: They were acquitted by a jury at Liverpool Crown Court.
Jury prejudice
Psychologist Richard Wiseman 1999	On Megalab '94 BBC's Tomorrow's World showed two groups of viewers a court case. The crucial point of the experiment was that viewers were divided into two groups; one group judged a defendant with no distinguishing features, while the other group judged a defendant with stereotypical 'criminal' features. In both cases the summing up and the age, gender and race of the defendant were identical - the only difference was the face. 65,000 viewers phoned in their verdict, and the result showed that while 31% found the 'control defendant' guilty, 41% found the 'criminal stereotype' guilty, details here.
Juries in civil cases
Special verdicts in civil cases	In criminal cases they normally simply find a defendant guilty or not guilty. In civil cases the jury is required to answer certain questions, the framing of which can be a cause for concern. The judge's main task is to separate fact from law and identify the key issues of fact for the jury to determine. At the conclusion of the evidence the judge decides if there is any case to go to the jury - if there is, jury questions are framed and closing speeches will reflect the questions. The judge then sums up the relevant law and facts. The jury tries both disputed issues of fact (liability) as well as damages (compensation). However current practice is to ask them to determine liability first and only retire again to consider damages if they find in favour of the claimant. In practice, most jury trials in the county court involve actions against the police for false imprisonment, often with associated claims for battery. The claimant will usually be legally aided and represented by counsel.
A jury will assess damages (the amount of compensation is called "quantum")	The amount of compensation a successful claimant will receive is known as the "quantum of damages". This is for the jury to decide within the guidelines set out in Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997]. This case radically altered the way juries are to be assisted and directed in assessing quantum. Before 1997 the law was clear that no monetary guidance could be given. In Ward v James [1966], Lord Denning said no help could or should be given to juries as it would develop into an auction with counsel and the judge urging rival figures. But the showbiz cases of Rantzen v Mirror Group [1994] and Elton John v MGN Ltd [1996] were the turning point in defamation, allied to section 8 of the Court and Legal Services Act 1990.
Jury's own research on internet	Not every conviction in which the jury (contrary to instructions) undertake their own research on the internet during retirement will be unsafe. Where the material was extraneous to the jury’s deliberations, the Court of Appeal may examine it. If there was any real possibility that a juror may have been influenced improperly by the material to convict, the conviction would be unsafe. Unlike R v Karakaya [2005] CA where the material was of a campaigning nature asserting that acquittals for rape were too frequent, in this case, it related in the main to sentencing. It was clear by the enquiries which the jury made of the judge as to the law that they were turning to him for authoritative rulings about the law. R v Marshall & Crump [2007] CA.