Judges - Lord Chancellor's dual role

Effect of Constitutional Reform Act 2005	The UK officially split the judiciary from the government on 3 April 2006. The 'Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice' ceased to be the head of the judiciary, this is now the role of the Lord Chief Justice (LCJ). The LCJ has no overt political role unlike the 'Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice'.
The position of the 'Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice' is under scrutiny as part of the reform of the House of Lords.
Several leading figures have called for reform, including	1. Lord Scarman, the retired law lord; 2. Lord Patten, the former Tory minister; 3. Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC; and 4. Lord Alexander of Weedon, QC.
The 'Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice'	Overtly political A leading member of the Government party Has a seat in Cabinet. In practice always an experienced barrister but may not have been a senior judge. E.g. Lord Hailsham and Lord Irvine never held any judicial office. Lord Mackay had previously been a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Lords Irvine, Havers and Elwyn-Jones had been Recorders.
Buffer between Government and the judiciary	"Unique" position enabled him to act as a buffer between Government and the judiciary. To assert the right of judges to uphold the law. This is no longer relevant as his role as head of the judiciary has now been taken by the Lord Chief Justice.
No longer vote	The law lords should no longer vote in the House of Lords. Reform the House of Lords has been slowly taking shape but not without resistance. The Blair government wanted an elected upper house but this was rejected by the Lords themselves.
Reject the idea of a supreme court	Lord Chancellors have repeatedly stood by their right to hear cases in the House of Lords and reject the idea of a supreme court to replace the law lords as the highest appeal court, this battle has been lost and the Supreme Court will start hearing cases in 2009.
McGonnell v United Kingdom (2000) ECHR	[Human Rights – Guernsey - Right to fair trial -Separation of powers] M contended that the dismissal of a planning appeal by the Guernsey Royal Court Bailiff was flawed due to a lack of independence and objective impartiality and therefore he was not given a fair trial because the judge hearing his appeal was also a member of Guernsey's executive and legislature. [The decision is not directly binding in England and Wales but could pave the way for challenges against decisions made by the Lord Chancellor]. Held: The Bailiff had been personally involved with legislative proceedings, which had concerned M’s application and therefore the direct involvement in the passage of legislation, had undermined his impartiality when determining M's planning appeal. Application allowed.