The Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division is called the
Administrative Court
when dealing with judicial review.
In October 2000 a separate Administrative
Court was formed to deal with applications for judicial review and similar
matters.
This Court forms part of the Queen's Bench
Division of the High Court, and replaced the former Crown Office List.
At the same time, the orders available to
the court in judicial review proceedings were renamed.
-
The order of certiorari; replaced by a
quashing order,
-
Mandamus by a mandatory order, and
-
Prohibition by a prohibiting order.
The substance of the various orders, and the
circumstances in which they are granted, did not change.
As well as having an original jurisdiction of their own, all three
divisions of the High Court have appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals
from lower Courts and tribunals.
The Divisional Court of the Chancery
Division deals with appeals in bankruptcy matters from the County Court.
The Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division deals largely with
certain appeals on points of law from many Courts.
The Divisional Court of
the Family Division deals largely with appeals from Magistrates Courts in
matrimonial matters a 'next friend' or 'guardian ad litem'
Lord Woolf CJ, at the sitting of the court,
handed down the following practice direction.
On 21 March 2000, Sir Jeffery Bowman as Chairman of the Review of the
Crown Office List reported to the Lord Chancellor. One of the
recommendations of the review was: "There is a continuing need for a
specialist court as part of the High Court to deal with public and
administrative law cases. To emphasise that this is the principal work of
the Crown Office List, it should be renamed 'the Administrative Court.'"
A further recommendation was that from among the High Court judges
nominated to hear cases from the Crown Office List there should be
appointed a lead nominated judge with overall responsibility for the
speed, efficiency and economy with which the work of the Crown Office List
is conducted. The Lord Chancellor has accepted both these recommendations.
The practice direction to be issued together with the new rules for
judicial review which are intended to come into force at the same time as
the Human Rights Act 1998 on 2 October 2000 will deal in detail with the
new procedure. In particular, the new rules will provide that an order for
mandamus should be known as a mandatory order, an order for prohibition
should be known as a prohibiting order and an order of certiorari should
be known as a quashing order.
From the coming into force of the new rules, the Crown Office List will be
known as the Administrative Court and references to the Crown Office List,
wherever they appear, should be construed accordingly. Cases which
previously would have been heard in the Crown Office List will be heard in
the Administrative Court. The nominated judge who will initially act as
lead judge is Scott Baker J.
The office previously known as the Crown Office, which was responsible for
managing the Crown Office List, will from the same date be known as the
Administrative Court Office and any references to that office should also
be construed accordingly.
Proceedings which would have previously been issued in the Crown Office
should, from the coming into force of the new rules, refer in their
heading to the Administrative Court. The parties to an application for
judicial review should be described in the proceedings as being:
"The Queen on the application of (name of applicant)-Claimant, versus, the
public body against whom the proceedings are brought-Defendant."
This practice direction does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to
make the orders referred to above, which are the successors of the
prerogative writs, and the Administrative Court shall exercise all the
powers which were previously exercised in relation to cases in the Crown
Office List.
This practice direction is issued with the agreement of the
'Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice'.
Robert
Goff LJ explains what the Divisional Court is.....
R v
Greater Manchester Coroner, Ex parte
Tal and Another [1985] Queen's Bench Division
In
considering this question, it is not to be forgotten that there is no
court known as "the
Divisional Court".
We are not here concerned with a court such as the Court of Appeal,
which is one court, though it usually sits in a number of divisions: see
Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718, 725, per Lord Greene
MR.
A divisional court of a
particular division, for example of the Queen's Bench Division, is not the
divisional court of that division. Whatever their
historical background, the status of divisional courts today is to be
found in the relevant provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
Section 151(4) provides that "'divisional court' (with or without capital
letters) means a divisional court constituted under section 66."
Section 66 provides:
"(1)
Divisional courts may be held for the
transaction of any business in the High Court which is, by or by virtue of
rules of court or any other statutory provision, required to be heard by a
divisional court. (2) Any
number of divisional courts may sit at the same time.
(3) A divisional court shall be constituted of not less than two
judges. (4) Every judge of the
High Court shall be qualified to sit in any divisional court.
(5) The judge who is, according to the order of precedence under
this Act, the senior of the judges constituting a divisional court shall
be the president of the court."
Furthermore, under the heading "The High Court.
General jurisdiction," section 19 provides:
"(1) The High Court shall be a superior court of record.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be
exercisable by the High Court
(a) all such jurisdiction (whether civil or
criminal) as is conferred on it by this or any other Act; and
(b) all such
other jurisdiction (whether civil or criminal) as was exercisable by it
immediately before the commencement of this Act (including jurisdiction
conferred on a judge of the High Court by any statutory provision).
(3) Any jurisdiction of the High Court shall be exercised only by a
single judge of that court, except in so far as it is--
(a) by or by
virtue of rules of court or any other statutory provision required to be
exercised by a divisional court; or
(b) by rules of court made exercisable
by a master, registrar or other officer of the court, or by any other
person.
(4) The specific
mention elsewhere in this Act of any jurisdiction covered by subsection
(2) shall not derogate from the generality of that subsection."
From
this it follows that every divisional court is simply a court, constituted
of not less than two judges, held for the transaction of business of the
High Court, which is (by rules of court or by statute) required to be
heard by a divisional court.
Among the business of the High Court required to be so heard are to be
found applications for judicial review in any criminal cause or matter, or
in other causes or matters where the court so directs: see RSC,
Ord 53, r 5(1) and (2).
It is also however to be observed that, when a divisional court is
constituted to hear an application for judicial review, it is not sitting
in an appellate capacity.
It
is not hearing an appeal from another court, nor is it considering a
question of law on a case stated by another court, as in the case of
appeals by way of cases stated by magistrates' courts. It is exercising
what is often called a supervisory jurisdiction.
That jurisdiction is exercised by the High Court over inferior
courts and tribunals. It is only exercised by a divisional court when
required to do so by statute or by rules of court, and any decision made
in the exercise of that jurisdiction may be the subject of appeal, either
to the Court of Appeal in civil cases, or to the House of Lords (under the
requisite conditions) in criminal cases.
If a judge of the High Court sits exercising the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court then it is, in our judgment, plain that the
relevant principle of stare decisis is the principle applicable in the
case of a judge of first instance exercising the jurisdiction of the High
Court, viz, that he will follow a decision of
another judge of first instance, unless he is convinced that that judgment
is wrong, as a matter of judicial comity; but he is not bound to follow
the decision of a judge of equal jurisdiction (see
Huddersfield Police Authority v Watson [1947] KB 842, 848, per Lord
Goddard CJ), for either the judge exercising such supervisory jurisdiction
is (as we think) sitting as a judge of first instance, or his position is
so closely analogous that the principle of stare decisis applicable in the
case of a judge of first instance is applicable to him.
In our
judgment, the same principle is applicable when the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court is exercised not by a single judge, but by
a divisional court, where two or three judges are exercising precisely the
same jurisdiction as the single judge.
We have no doubt that it will be only in rare cases that a
divisional court will think it fit to depart from a decision of another
divisional court exercising this jurisdiction.
Furthermore, we find it difficult to imagine that a single judge
exercising this jurisdiction would ever depart from a decision of a
divisional court.
If any
question of such a departure should arise before a single judge, a
direction can be made under RSC, Ord 53, r
5(2), that the relevant application should be made before a divisional
court.
These are, therefore,
the principles which we propose to apply in the present case.
